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Summary 
Various types of rules govern many areas of life in a sectional title scheme. The 
Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 prescribes model management and conduct rules in 
its regulations. Other non-prescribed rules are adopted by either the developers 
initially or later by the trustees of the body corporate. These rules provide for the 
control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of the sections and the 
common property in the scheme. Sectional owners and other occupiers have the 
entitlements of use and enjoyment of their individual sections and their share in the 
common property of the sectional title scheme, in proportion to their participation 
quota. These entitlements are restricted by the rules in operation within the scheme.  
 
Although these rules limit the entitlements of sectional owners and other occupiers in 
the interest of the sectional title community, they may not be unreasonable in their 
application and effect. In some instances, the application of the rules might exceed 
the bounds of reasonableness and result in unfair discrimination, arbitrary 
deprivation, unfair administrative action or restrictions on access to courts for dispute 
resolution. If certain rules are unreasonable in their application, based on one or 
more of the abovementioned grounds, the court must interpret the potentially 
impermissible rules and if the court cannot avoid a declaration of invalidity by 
implementing a constitutional remedy such as reading-up, reading-down, reading-in 
or severance, these impermissible rules will need to be substituted, amended or 
repealed and replaced because they are potentially unconstitutional and invalid.  
 
After a statutory and constitutional enquiry into the nature, scope, application, 
operation and effect of the rules governing sectional title schemes, it can be 
concluded that the various types of rules governing sectional title schemes restrict 
and limit sectional owners’ and occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment of their 
individual sections and share in the common property. However, after being tested 
against section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and other 
non-property rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, to determine if the rules are 
reasonable in their application and constitutionally permissible, it can be seen that 
the application of the rules do not necessarily amount to arbitrary deprivations of 
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property and that they can be justified in terms of the Constitution because there is 
sufficient reasons for the particular regulations and they are procedurally fair. 
 
The various different types of rules governing sectional title schemes serve as 
reasonable regulations in as far as they contribute to a harmonious relationship 
between the trustees of the body corporate and the sectional owners and occupiers 
as members of the body corporate as well as between the members of the body 
corporate inter se. The rules serve an important function in this regard. Therefore, 
they are considered reasonable and constitutionally valid in as far as they do not 
enforce excessive regulation and as long as they are equally applicable and do not 
unfairly differentiate in their application. 
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Opsomming 
Verskeie tipes reëls reguleer alledaagse aangeleenthede in ‘n deeltitelskema. Die 
Wet op Deeltitels 95 van 1986 maak voorsiening vir voorgeskrewe bestuurs- en 
gedragsreëls in die regulasies. Die ontwikkelaars of die trustees van die regspersoon 
kan aanvanklik met die stigting van die skema of op ‘n latere stadium addisionele 
reëls byvoeg wat nie alreeds deur die Wet voorgeskryf is nie. Die reëls maak 
voorsiening vir die beheer, bestuur, administrasie, gebruik en genot van die eenheid 
en die gemeenskaplike eiendom in die skema. Die deeleienaars van deeltitelskemas 
en ander okkupeerders van die skema is geregtig om hulle individuele eenhede 
sowel as die gemeenskaplike eiendom, in ooreenstemming met hulle 
deelnemingskwota, te gebruik en geniet; en dit vorm deel van hul 
inhoudsbevoegdhede.  
 
Hierdie inhoudsbevoegdhede word beperk deur die skema se reëls. Afgesien 
daarvan dat die reëls die deeleienaar en ander okkupeerders se 
inhoudsbevoegdhede beperk in die belang van die deeltitelgemeenskap, mag die 
reëls nie onredelik wees in die toepassing daarvan nie. In sommige gevalle kan die 
toepassing van die reëls die perke van redelikheid oorskry en neerkom op 
ongeregverdigde diskriminasie, arbitrêre ontneming, ongeregverdigde 
administratiewe handeling of ‘n beperking plaas op toegang tot die howe met die oog 
op dispuutoplossing. Indien daar bevind word dat sekere reëls onredelik is in die 
toepassing daarvan op grond van een of meer van die voorafgemelde gronde, moet 
die hof artikel 39 van die Grondwet volg en die reël interpreteer om ‘n deklarasie van 
ongeldigheid te vermy. As die hof dit nie kan vermy deur middel van 
konstitutusionele remedies soos “op-lesing”, “af-lesing”, “afskeiding” of “in-lesing” 
nie, sal die reëls gewysig of geskrap en vervang moet word, anders sal die reël 
ongrondwetlik wees en ongeldig verklaar word.  
 
Na afloop van ‘n statutêre en konstitusionele ondersoek ten opsigte van die aard, 
omvang, toepassing, werking en effek van die reëls wat deeltitelskemas reguleer 
word daar bevind dat die verskeie tipes reëls wat ‘n deeltitelskema reguleer ‘n 
beperking plaas op die inhousdbevoegdhede van deeltiteleienaars en ander 
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okkupeerders wat betref die reg om die eenheid sowel as die gemeenskaplike 
eiendom te gebruik en geniet. Ten einde te bepaal of die reëls redelik in die 
toepassing daarvan sowel as grondwetlik toelaatbaar is, word dit getoets in terme 
van artikel 25 van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 1996 en ander 
regte in die Handves van Regte. Daar word bevind dat die toepassing van die reëls 
nie noodwendig ‘n arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom is nie en dat dit geregverdig kan 
word in terme van die Grondwet omdat daar voldoende redes vir die spesifieke 
regulasies is en omdat dat hulle prosedureel billik is. 
  
Die verskeie tipes reëls wat ‘n deeltitelskema reguleer dien as redelike regulasies 
sover dit bydra tot ‘n harmonieuse verhouding tussen die trustees van die 
regspersoon, die deeltiteleienaars en die okkupeerders as lede van die regspersoon 
sowel as tussen die lede van die regspersoon inter se. Die reëls het ‘n belangrike 
funksie in hierdie verband. Die reëls word geag redelik en grondwetlik geldig te wees 
sover dit nie buitensporige regulasies afdwing nie, gelyk toegepas word en daar nie 
ongeregverdig gedifferensieer word in die toepassing daarvan nie. 
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1 Introduction 
1 1 Research question, hypothesis and methodology  
In this introductory chapter, the research question will be discussed, the hypothesis 
will be set out and the chosen methodology will be explained. The research question 
posed in this thesis is whether the rules governing sectional title schemes are 
constitutionally valid.1 Only the rules which are potentially unconstitutional in their 
application, operation and effect will be discussed in this thesis. Sectional title 
schemes are administered, controlled and managed by the trustees of the body 
corporate. These trustees have been democratically elected by the sectional owners 
or their authorised representatives or proxies, to represent them as a communal 
body, the body corporate. Sectional owners automatically become members of the 
body corporate when purchasing a unit in the scheme. Therefore, they have the right 
to vote in the determination of such matters as the nomination, election and 
appointment of trustees. The trustees fulfil their functions of administration and 
management by means of the various types of rules applicable within the scheme. 
The rules provide for the control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of 
the sections and the common property in the scheme.2 There are various types of 
rules which govern all matters of life in the scheme. The Sectional Titles Act3 
prescribes model management4 and conduct5 rules in its regulations. These rules 
form a clear and binding framework.6 Before a unit is alienated and the body 
corporate established, the developer of a sectional title scheme can initially 
substitute, add to, amend or withdraw the management rules to the extent that he is 
                                            
1
 The constitutional validity of the rules governing sectional title schemes will be tested against the 
relevant provisions in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. See chapter 4 for a 
discussion on the property clause and other non-property rights. 
2
 S 35(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
3
 95 of 1986. 
4
 Management rules are statutorily prescribed in the regulations of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
These model rules are found in s 35(2)(a) and Annex 8 of the Act. The model management rules 
regulate the activities of the trustees and the members of the body corporate with regard to the 
management and administration of the sectional title scheme. See further chapter 3 under the 
heading 3 2 2 for a discussion of the nature and purpose of these rules. 
5
 Conduct rules are statutorily prescribed in the regulations of the Sectional Titles Act. These model 
rules are found in s 35(2)(b) and Annex 9 of the Act. The model conduct rules determine the 
entitlements of use and enjoyment as well as the duties of the sectional owners and other occupiers 
of the scheme with regard to their individual sections and share in the common property. See further 
chapter 3 under the heading 3 2 3 for a discussion of the nature and purpose of these rules. 
6
 See Maree T Kits deeltitel oplossings (2001) 1. 

 
allowed in terms of the Sectional Titles Act.7 Once the first unit in the scheme is 
alienated and the body corporate is established,8 the management rules can be 
added to, amended or repealed by unanimous resolution9 of the body corporate.10 
The trustees can exercise their authority and discretion by adopting house rules 
which fulfil the needs of a particular scheme and provide for the daily management of 
the scheme.11 
 
Sectional owners have the right of ownership and the entitlements of use and 
enjoyment of their sections and the proportionate share in the common property of 
the sectional title scheme. Other occupiers have the entitlements of use and 
enjoyment of their leased section and accompanying share in the common property. 
These entitlements are restricted by the rules in operation within the scheme.  
Although these rules limit the sectional owners’ and other occupiers’ entitlements of 
use and enjoyment in the interest of the sectional title community, they may not be 
unreasonable in their application and effect.  
 
The hypothesis states that when evaluating the model management and conduct 
rules, as statutorily prescribed by the Sectional Titles Act, the rules initially 
substituted, added to, amended or repealed by the developer and later by the 
trustees of the body corporate of the sectional title scheme, it is expected that they 
restrict the rights and the entitlements of the sectional owners and other occupiers in 
the scheme. Each sectional owner and occupier has a right to use and enjoy their 
individual sections and the accompanying share in the common property. However, 
there is an assumption that these entitlements are limited by the enforcement of the 
rules. In some instances the application of the rules might exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness and result in unfair discrimination, arbitrary deprivation, unfair 
administrative action or restrictions on access to courts for dispute resolution. These 
                                            
7
 Refer to ss 11(3)(e) and 35(2) of the Sectional Titles Act. See further the discussion in chapter 3 
under the heading 3 2 1. 
8
 S 36(1). 
9
 Resolution taken unanimously by all the members present at a general meeting at which at least 
80% of the total number of members of the body corporate are present or represented, or a resolution 
accepted in writing by all the members or their proxy/ies or their representatives. 
10
 Refer to s 35(2)(a) and regulation 30(4) of the Sectional Titles Act. See also the discussion in 
chapter 3 under the heading 3 2 1. 
11
 See the discussion of house rules in chapter 3 under the heading 3 2 4. 
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potentially problematic rules are amended or repealed, they must be interpreted in 
line with section 39 of the Constitution. The point of departure when interpreting 
potentially problematic rules is that it is the duty of the court to test the legislation12 
for inconsistency with the Constitution and to declare it invalid if it is inconsistent. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal13 set out a formula for dealing with constitutional 
challenges to legislation.14 If an interpretation in line with this formula is possible, the 
court must give effect to it. However, if an interpretation is impossible, the court must 
declare the act or section under consideration invalid. The Constitutional Court15 
endorsed the Supreme Court of Appeal’s approach of reading-down or reading-up of 
the impugned statutory provision. Following this approach prevents the act or section 
under consideration from being struck down because it is unconstitutional. Other 
constitutional remedies upon which the court can rely is severance and reading-in.16  
 
If it appears that rules may step over the bounds of reasonableness, are arbitrary in 
their application and have a discriminatory effect, they need to be tested against the 
relevant constitutional provisions to determine their constitutional validity. In order to 
perform a constitutional analysis of the rules governing sectional title schemes, a 
comparative approach has been followed. The chosen comparative jurisdictions are 
Australia, Germany, Israel and the United States of America.17 The position in each 
country will be discussed where relevant to the discussion in each chapter and the 
reasons behind the choices will also be examined. This comparative approach aids 
the discussion by giving examples of restrictions in the chosen jurisdictions that are 
similar in nature, operation, applicability and effect to those that govern sectional title 
schemes in South Africa.  
 
Reliance will be placed on several methodologies in order to fulfil the purpose of this 
evaluative discussion. Firstly, the common law position of immovable property 
                                            
12
 The court must test the potentially problematic statutorily prescribed or non-prescribed rule for 
inconsistency with the Constitution. 
13
 Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) at paras 10-11. 
14
 See the discussion in chapter 4 under the heading 4 3 1 for the steps involved in this formula. 
15
 Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security In re: S v Walters 2002 (4) SA 613 (CC) at paras 36-39. 
16
 Du Plessis L “Interpretation” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M Constitutional Law of South 
Africa Vol 2 (2nd ed 2009) 32.141. See the discussion in chapter 4 under the heading 4 3 1 for a 
definition of these terms. 
17
 See the discussion below for the reasons why these jurisdictions were chosen. 
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ownership will be discussed in a brief and general historical survey. The reasons for 
the introduction of sectional title schemes as an alternative to and not as a substitute 
for traditional ownership will be examined. The reason for introducing legislation, the 
procedure of introducing legislation, the purpose and the effect of the legislation as 
well as its success will all be discussed. 
 
Secondly, a statutory analysis will be used to discuss the legal nature of the rules 
governing sectional title schemes. The limitation of the sectional owners’ and 
occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment will be examined by looking at the 
relevant provisions in the Sectional Titles Act. The Act prescribes various obligations 
and duties for the sectional owners and occupiers to comply with. Various examples 
of restrictive rules will be examined and the amendment, operation, scope of 
application and enforcement of the rules will be discussed.  
 
Thirdly, a comparative survey will be used where relevant to the discussion. The 
comparative jurisdictions of Australia, Germany, Israel and the United States of 
America will be referred to and the reasons therefore will be examined where 
relevant to the discussion in each chapter. Only the relevant provisions in each 
jurisdiction’s legislation will be discussed. This thesis does not set out to give a full 
explanation of the legal system in each jurisdiction, nor does it explain all the 
restrictions applicable in each jurisdiction. Only the restrictions similar in application, 
operation and effect to the rules in South Africa will be discussed.  
Australia was chosen as the main comparative jurisdiction and referred to throughout 
the chapters because South Africa’s first generation statute was modelled to a large 
degree on the New South Wales Strata Titles Act,18 which in turn was largely 
influenced by the German Wohnungseigentumsgesetz. In chapter two, Germany 
was used as a comparative jurisdiction because of the similar factors influencing the 
introduction of legislation. In chapter three, Germany was chosen as a comparative 
jurisdiction because many of its statutory provisions serve as an example that South 
Africa may do well to follow in the future.19 The South African legislature also 
                                            
18
 The Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act of New South Wales 17 of 1961. 
19
 See the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 6 4. 
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incorporated some principles of condominium from the Israeli legislation. The Israeli 
Co-operative Houses Law of 1952 influenced the Sectional Titles Act20 because it 
was faced with a similar situation as South Africa at the time of the introduction of 
sectional title legislation. The Israeli law was found to be successful in its 
enforcement, operation and compliance, and therefore serves as a valuable 
comparative source, as can be seen in chapter two. In chapter four, the United 
States of America was used as a comparative jurisdiction. This jurisdiction has been 
chosen because of the wide range of constitutional cases where the right of equality 
has come into question and has been dealt with. 
 
Finally, a constitutional analysis will be used to determine whether the rules 
governing sectional title schemes are constitutionally valid in their application. In 
order to determine this, reference will be made to the property clause21 in the 
Constitution. The Constitutional Court decision of First National Bank of South Africa 
Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services22 
provides a useful test when interpreting section 25(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, 
it will be examined at length in the discussion.  
 
When determining whether a particular rule is constitutionally permissible, certain 
steps need to be followed. There must be an interest in property and a deprivation of 
this interest must occur. If the requirements of section 25(1) are complied with, the 
deprivation will be constitutionally valid. In this regard, the deprivation needs to occur 
in accordance with a law of general application, it must be in the public interest and it 
must not be arbitrary. These steps and requirements will be explained and examined 
in the discussion.23 The constitutional validity of the rules in light of other rights in the 
Bill of Rights of the Constitution will also be discussed. These non-property 
                                            
20
 66 of 1971. 
21
 S 25(1) of the Constitution. 
22
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
23
 Refer to chapter 4. 
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fundamental rights which will be discussed are the rights to equality,24 just 
administrative action25 and access to courts26 for dispute resolution. 
 
An example of a potentially problematic rule is section 44(1)(d) of the Sectional Titles 
Act. This is a statutorily prescribed rule, which deprives a sectional owner of his 
ownership entitlements of use and enjoyment of his section and share in the 
common property as well as those entitlements of other occupiers in the scheme. 
The rule provides that a sectional owner and other occupier must “use and enjoy the 
common property in such a manner as not unreasonably to interfere with the use 
and enjoyment thereof by other owners or other persons lawfully on the premises.” 
This rule requires sectional owners and other occupiers to behave in a way that will 
not disturb the use and enjoyment of the sections and common property by other 
sectional owners, occupiers and other persons lawfully on the premises.27 
Compliance with this rule ensures that all the residents living in a scheme will form a 
harmonious community, with the least cause for conflict and disputes. Therefore, this 
rule serves a legitimate aim and will be reasonable in so far as it is applied fairly and 
equally to all residents in the scheme. 
 
Another example is the statutorily prescribed rule in section 44(1)(e) of the Sectional 
Titles Act, which provides that a sectional owner and other occupier must “not use 
his section or exclusive use area, or permit it to be used, in such a manner or for 
such a purpose as shall cause a nuisance to any occupier of a section.” This rule 
prohibits any behaviour or activity that may reasonably be perceived as causing a 
nuisance to other sectional owners and other occupiers. Noise, for example, can 
interfere with the peaceful use and enjoyment of another unit by its owner, occupier 
or by any person lawfully using the common property. This rule can be seen as a 
legitimate limitation of the sectional owners’ and other occupiers’ entitlements of use 
                                            
24
 S 9 of the Constitution. Reference will also be made to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
25
 S 33 of the Constitution. Reference will also be made to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
3 of 2000. 
26
 S 34 of the Constitution. 
27
 Refer to the discussion of these rules in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 6. 
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and enjoyment because compliance with the rule will ensure that causes for disputes 
do not arise. 
 
1 2 Overview of chapters 
Chapter two involves a discussion on the historical background and development of 
immovable property ownership in South Africa before the introduction of sectional 
title schemes. The Roman Dutch common law position is discussed briefly with 
reference to the principles of superficies solo cedit (omne quod inaedificatur solo 
cedit),28 cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum,29 plena in re potestas30 and the 
subsequent amendment of these common law principles in the case of sectional 
titles. Due to factors such as the housing shortage and the subsequent need for 
more affordable housing, there was a need for statutory intervention. Therefore, 
legislation was introduced. The main reasons for the introduction of legislation 
making provision for sectional ownership will be examined. When and how this 
legislation was introduced and the purpose, effect and success of the legislation will 
also be discussed. Sectional title legislation in South Africa will be compared with 
legislation introduced and in effect in Australia,31 Germany32 and Israel.33 The 
reasons for choosing these jurisdictions will be discussed where relevant in the 
chapter.  
 
                                            
28
 This common law principle means that the owner of a piece of land is also the owner of everything 
erected on and permanently attached to the land. See Van der Merwe CG Sectional titles, share 
blocks and time-sharing Vol 1 (2010) 1.3; Cowen DV New patterns of landownership. The 
transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re potestas (1984) 52 and 57-63; Van der Walt 
AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property (6th ed 2009) 59; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM 
and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 445-446 and Van der 
Merwe CG Sakereg at (2nd ed 1989) 396. 
29
 This common law principle means that the owner of a piece of land is also the owner of the air 
space above the land. See Van der Walt AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property (6th ed 
2009) 60; See Cowen DV New patterns of landownership. The transformation of the concept of 
ownership as plena in re potestas (1984) 51 and 54-57 and Cowen DV “From sectional to airspace 
title” 1985 Acta Juridica 333-348 at 333. 
30
 This common law principle means that the owner of land may exercise his entitlements of use and 
enjoyment without interference from others. See Van der Walt AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the 
law of property (6th ed 2009) 60; Cowen DV New patterns of landownership. The transformation of the 
concept of ownership as plena in re potestas (1984) 67-70 and Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and 
Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 2006) 446. 
31
 Emphasis will be placed on strata title schemes in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland as 
well as the legislation operative in each jurisdiction. 
32
 The legislation in operation in Germany is the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz. 
33
 The legislation in operation in Israel is the Co-operative Houses Law of 1952. 
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In chapter three, the focus will be on the legal nature of the statutorily prescribed 
model management and conduct rules, the rules initially substituted, added to, 
amended or repealed by the developer and later by the trustees of the body 
corporate. These rules impose limitations on the sectional owners’ and occupiers’ 
entitlements of use and enjoyment of their individual sections and share of the 
common property. However, most of these rules will not be unfairly restrictive on 
condition that they are applied equally and reasonably.34 Examples of the most 
relevant and problematic restrictions will be examined in this chapter. Most of the 
rules can be amended by either the developer or the trustees of the body corporate. 
The amendment will be dependent on the needs of the particular scheme. In order to 
successfully achieve this, an amendment procedure needs to be followed. This 
procedure will be further discussed in this chapter.  
 
The rules operate within the scheme and govern the control, management, 
administration, use and enjoyment of the sections and the common property.35 The 
rules impose binding duties and obligations on all the owners and occupiers within a 
scheme.36 In order to ensure that the community of sectional owners and occupiers 
live in relative harmony, there must be effective enforcement mechanisms and 
sanctions for non-compliance with the rules. These mechanisms and sanctions will 
be closely examined in this chapter.  
 
Disputes are inevitable in any community where the residents live in such close 
proximity to one another. The causes of disputes, the parties involved and the 
various methods of dispute resolution will be examined in this chapter. A 
comparative survey will be used where relevant, concentrating on the jurisdictions 
that have similar approaches with regard to the above mentioned issues and those 
that have influenced South African legislation, namely Australia37 and Germany.38  
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 S 35(3) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. See further the discussion in chapter 4. 
35
 S 35(2). 
36
 S 35. 
37
 In Australia, this form of property ownership is known as strata titles. 
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 In Germany this form of property ownership is known as Wohnungseigentum. 
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In chapter four, a constitutional analysis is used to determine whether the various 
types of rules governing sectional title schemes are unconstitutional deprivations of 
property rights. In order to determine whether particular rules are constitutionally 
permissible, the extent to which they limit entitlements needs to be examined. A 
limitation is essentially a “justifiable infringement”,39 which is not unconstitutional if it 
occurs for a reason that is accepted as a justification for infringing the rights in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. In this 
chapter, the focus will be on two constitutional enquiries.  
 
The first enquiry concerns the constitutional validity of the restrictive rules governing 
a sectional title scheme in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. It will be 
determined whether the restrictive rules’ application amounts to an arbitrary 
deprivation of property, which would be unenforceable due to its constitutional 
invalidity, unless the deprivation can be justified in terms of the limitation clause.40  
 
The decision of First National Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services41 provides a useful test when 
interpreting section 25(1) of the Constitution.42 Ackermann J developed a test for the 
property challenge43 by dividing the property clause enquiry into several stages, 
formulated as a set of questions. In terms of this methodology, it must be determined 
whether the law complained of affects property in terms of section 25(1). If it does, it 
must be asked whether it amounts to a deprivation of property by law.44 If this 
question is answered in the affirmative, it must be determined whether the 
deprivation is consistent with section 25(1) and if it is not, it must be determined 
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 Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook (5th ed 2005) 164. 
40
 S 36 of the Constitution. 
41
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
42
 See Freedman W “The constitutional right not to be deprived of property: the constitutional court 
keeps its options open” 2006 TSAR 83–100 at 83. 
43
 See First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Services para 46. See further Hopkins K and Hofmeyr K “New perspectives on property” (2003) 120 
SALJ 48–62 at 54 and Freedman W “The constitutional right not to be deprived of property: the 
constitutional court keeps its options open” 2006 TSAR 83–100 at 90. 
44
 Refer to 4 2 4 1 for a discussion on whether the Sectional Titles Act and the rules it prescribes is 
considered “law”. 
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whether the deprivation can be justified under section 36(1) of the Constitution.45 
According to the Court, if a deprivation is arbitrary and not justifiable, “that is the end 
of the matter. The provision is unconstitutional.”46 
 
The second constitutional enquiry will focus on other Bill of Rights issues. In this 
regard, the restrictive rules will be tested against certain non-property fundamental 
rights in the Bill of Rights,47 in order to determine if they constitute constitutional 
limitations. The following specific constitutionally entrenched rights will be looked at 
more closely: equality,48 specifically unfair discrimination;49 just administrative 
action;50 and access to courts.51  
 
The rules governing a sectional title scheme must be reasonable and equally 
applicable to all sectional owners of units which are used for substantially the same 
purpose.52 If these requirements are complied with and the rules are not applied 
arbitrarily, they will be constitutionally valid and enforceable. If there is differentiation 
with regard to the application of the rules, it should be asked whether the 
differentiation bears a rational connection to a legitimate purpose. If the 
differentiation bears no rational connection to a legitimate purpose, it will be contrary 
to section 9(1) of the Constitution, the equality provision, as it amounts to 
discrimination. If the differentiation does bear a rational connection to a legitimate 
purpose, it still amounts to discrimination and will be contrary to section 9(3) and 9(4) 
of the Constitution, unless the discrimination is fair in terms of section 9(5) of the 
                                            
45
 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 54 and 137. In terms of s 25(8) of the 
Constitution, it is in principle possible to justify a limitation that does not satisfy the requirements in s 
25(1), which must be complied with for formal validity, as long as it complies with the requirements in 
s 36(1). It is considered unlikely that the deprivation will not be in conflict with the requirements in 
section 36 if the deprivation is in conflict with the formal requirements in s 25(1). See further First 
National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services 
para 58. 
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 First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
Services para 58. 
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 Found in chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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 S 9 of the Constitution. 
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 S 9(3). 
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 S 33. 
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 S 34. 
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Constitution,53 and therefore legitimate. For example, a rule prohibiting occupation to 
residents below a certain age differentiates between people from different age 
groups. However, this limitation could be rationally connected to a legitimate purpose 
of providing a specialised form of accommodation suitable to the needs of the 
elderly. 
 
From this perspective, reference will be made to case law from a comparative 
jurisdiction, namely the United States of America. This jurisdiction has been chosen 
because of the wide range of constitutional cases where the right of equality has 
come into question and has been dealt with. 
 
The concluding chapter five summarises what the thesis has set out to do, namely to 
answer the research question. It applies the methodology in order to reach the 
conclusions stated in the hypothesis. It gives a brief overview of the conclusions 
reached in each chapter and comes to a final conclusion based on the research 
question posed in this introductory chapter.   
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 Ackermann L “Equality and the South African Constitution: the role of dignity” (2000) 60 ZaöRV 
537-556 at 545-546. 
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2 Comparative history of sectional title legislation 
2 1 Introduction  
This chapter will involve a comparative discussion on the historical background and 
development of ownership of immovable property in South Africa before the 
introduction of sectional title schemes. This historical survey is needed because it 
examines the main reasons for the introduction of legislation making provision for 
sectional ownership, as well as when and how this legislation was introduced. The 
purpose, effect and success of the legislation will also be discussed. The Roman-
Dutch common law position will be discussed, with reference to the principles of 
superficies solo cedit (omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit),54 cuius est solum eius est 
usque ad coelum,55 plena in re potestas56 and the subsequent amendment of these 
common law principles in the case of sectional title schemes.  
 
For the purposes of this discussion and the topic in general, the most important 
sections of the legislation are the provisions relating to the rules. The rules were 
introduced to serve as important regulations of the use and enjoyment of sections 
and common property in the sectional title scheme. The successful enforcement of 
and compliance with these rules ensure that sectional title schemes serve the 
purpose for which they were intended and provide an alternative form of home 
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 This common law principle means that the owner of a piece of land is also the owner of everything 
erected on and permanently attached to the land. See Van der Merwe CG Sectional titles, share 
blocks and time-sharing Vol 1 (2010) 1.3; Cowen DV New patterns of landownership. The 
transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re potestas (1984) 52 and 57-63; Badenhorst 
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space above the land. See Van der Walt AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property (6th ed 
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title” 1985 Acta Juridica 333-348 at 333. 
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 This common law principle means that the owner of land may exercise his entitlements of use and 
enjoyment without interference from others. See Van der Walt AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the 
law of property (6th ed 2009) 60; Cowen DV New patterns of landownership. The transformation of the 
concept of ownership as plena in re potestas (1984) 67-70 and Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and 
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ownership as a solution to the housing shortage and other needs as will be 
discussed.57  
 
A brief historical comparison will be drawn between sectional title legislation in South 
Africa, Australia, Germany and Israel. These jurisdictions were chosen because they 
best compare with the South African model as they faced similar problems to those 
that were found in South Africa at the time of the introduction of sectional title 
schemes, which led to the need for an alternative form of land ownership.58  The 
Sectional Titles Act59 was modelled to a large degree on the Australian Strata Titles 
Act60 operative in New South Wales, which in turn was largely influenced by the 
German Wohnungseigentumsgesetz.61 The South African legislature also 
incorporated some principles of condominium from the Israeli legislation.62 
 
2 2 Common law position 
Ownership of property was traditionally described by common law jurists63 as an 
absolute, comprehensive, unrestricted and individualistic right, albeit subject to 
qualifications.64 The traditional definition of ownership was one where the owner was 
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 For a discussion on the nature and function of the rules, refer to chapter 3. 
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allowed absolute powers to deal with his property as he pleased, subject to certain 
limitations imposed by private65 and public law. In South Africa, modern 
developments have led to the move away from the idea of exclusivity, where the 
owner of property had the right to exclude anyone from interference with his 
property.66 This break from the traditional ownership paradigm67 recognised 
limitations and duties which were imposed on the owner through legislative 
intervention,68 which restricted his right of ownership to his property,69 in order to 
serve some social or public interest.70 These restrictions need to be permissible.71 
According to Spoelstra AJ in Gien v Gien:72 
“Eiendomsreg is die mees volledige saaklike reg wat ‘n person ten opsigte van ‘n saak 
kan hê. Die uitgangspunt is dat ‘n person wat ‘n onroerende saak aanbetref, met en op sy 
eiendom kan maak wat hy wil. Hierdie op die oog af ongebonde vryheid is egter ‘n halwe 
waarheid. Die absolute beskikkingsbevoegheid van ‘n eienaar bestaan binne die perke 
wat die reg daarop plaas.” 
 
Translated this means that ownership is the most complete right a person can have 
with regard to a thing. The point of departure is that a person, as far as immoveable 
property is concerned, can do on and with his property as he likes. However, this 
apparently unlimited freedom is only partially true. The absolute entitlements of an 
owner exist within the boundaries of the law.  
                                                                                                                                       
1979 (2) SA 113 (T) and Johannesburg Council v Rand Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314 at 1319, 
where Wessels J quoted Savigny’s definition of ownership, namely “the unrestricted and exclusive 
control which a person has over a thing”.  
65
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 See Van der Walt AJ “The fragmentation of land rights” (1992) 8 SAJHR 431-450 at 433 and Lewis 
C “The modern concept of ownership of land” 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266 at 244. 
71
 See Birks P “The Roman law concept of dominium and the idea of absolute ownership” 1985 Acta 
Juridica 1-37 at 1. 
72
 1979 (2) SA 113 (T) at para 1120. 
	
 
Reference can also be made to the decision in Body Corporate of Albany Court v 
Nedbank,73 where it was stated that: 
The powerful right of ownership of an immovable property is not an absolute right. 
Indeed, the very essence of the Act is to render many of the interests of owners of units in 
a sectional scheme subservient to the will of the majority. Certain of the normal rights of 
an owner, for instance the right to keep pets or make building alterations, may be 
curtailed by the rules imposed by the majority. It is not suggested on behalf of the 
applicants that such interference with the rights of an owner is unconstitutional, and nor 
could it be. The interdependence of owners within a single building or complex logically 
requires co-operation, and compliance with and subservience to the will of the majority.” 
 
Therefore, in order to ensure the proper working of the sectional title scheme as a 
whole and to maintain harmonious relationships between owners in a scheme, it was 
necessary to re-evaluate some of the traditional common law characteristics of 
individual ownership of immovable property upon the commencement of the 
sectional titles legislation.74 It is necessary to point out that this re-evaluation of the 
common law principles applied only in the case of sectional titles because the 
introduction of these schemes served as the introduction of an alternative form of 
home ownership.75  
 
It was also necessary to impose legitimate limitations by way of the statutorily 
prescribed rules, house rules and the rules added to and amended by the developer 
or the trustees of the body corporate of a sectional title scheme. These rules limit the 
rights or entitlements of an owner or other occupier as residents in a scheme in order 
to fairly and reasonably uphold the rights of another resident living in the scheme, 
thereby creating a balance between the parties involved.76 Modern legal writers raise 
the question whether sectional ownership is “genuine ownership”77 as with traditional 
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ownership. Although there are certain restrictions and limitations imposed on 
sectional owners which do not normally apply to traditional individual owners, these 
restrictions are considered to be necessary and do not justify denying the status of 
genuine legal ownership to sectional owners. 
 
Horizontal subdivision of land was not recognised in Roman law.78 Therefore, 
sectional ownership of a part of a building was unknown.79 Consequently, a building 
and the land upon which it stood could not be sold or transferred separately, as it 
was seen as being a unit because ownership occurred in its entirety and not in 
individual parts.80 The South African legal system is based on Roman-Dutch law.81 
Therefore, the common law made no provision for sectional ownership in South 
African law.82 Statutory intervention was needed in order to introduce sectional 
ownership by way of legislation. 
 
With the introduction of the Sectional Titles Act,83 several common law principles 
regarding ownership of immovable property were amended in the case of sectional 
titles.84 The common law principle, superficies solo cedit, was repealed in the case of 
sectional titles. This principle along with the principle of accessio,85 restricted the 
separate ownership of parts of a building and land as with sectional titles because 
the person owning the piece of land automatically owns the buildings permanently 
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built on the land.86 Due to the fact that this principle became part of Roman-Dutch 
common law initially and later South African law, it needed to be repealed in order for 
sectional titles to be introduced. There was a growing economic need for the 
introduction of sectional titles and it was “recognised that one should not accept the 
accession principle as holy writ”.87 Therefore, this principle was repealed in the case 
of sectional titles. This essentially meant that the common or joint owners of the 
common property were not co-owners of everything attached to the land but 
everyone was the sole owner of a part or a section.  
 
According to Roman law, there was only one method in which land could be defined 
as the object of ownership, namely two-dimensionally.88 Land was undefined 
horizontally and ownership of different levels or “strata”89 was unknown. The reasons 
for this were that “Roman jurists wished to avoid difficulties of access”90 and wanted 
“to avoid a multiplicity of reciprocal servitudes which ownership of strata seemed to 
involve.”91 This method of defining land became part of the Roman-Dutch common 
law and later it was incorporated into South African law. By repealing the common 
law principle cuius est solum, as defined above, in the case of sectional titles, a 
section owned by the sectional owner was described both in terms of the vertical 
boundaries and horizontal subdivisions. Sectional ownership introduced horizontal 
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subdivision by defining the boundaries of a section as the median line of dividing the 
floors, walls and ceilings.92  
 
The common law principle plena in re potestas was “to a large degree obviated”93 by 
the joint exercise of the sectional owners and occupiers of their entitlements to the 
common property, subject to the rules of the sectional title scheme, which limited the 
use and enjoyment of the entitlements in the interest of all the residents in a 
sectional title scheme as a whole. According to this common law principle, the 
traditional concept of ownership was seen as “autonomous”,94 “individualistic”95 and 
“unrestricted”.96 As mentioned previously, in principle, an owner could do almost 
anything he wanted with his immovable property. However, the law did restrict this 
exercise of rights “in the interests of neighbouring owners and the general public.”97 
With the introduction of sectional titles, there has been a move away from this 
traditional concept of landownership towards a more communal and restricted form 
of home ownership where the rights and interests of all residents living in a scheme 
are upheld.  
  
2 3  Reasons for introducing sectional title schemes as an 
alternative to and not as a substitute for traditional ownership 
The primary aim behind introducing sectional title schemes as an alternative form of 
ownership was to satisfy the need for more affordable housing.98 Sectional 
ownership satisfied this need while providing for the “common attributes of full legal 
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ownership.”99 For this reason sectional title schemes were seen as being an 
alternative to and not a substitute for traditional ownership.100 After the introduction 
of sectional title schemes, it was found that they provided mainly for higher-income 
groups who could afford to purchase a unit and contribute towards the maintenance 
of the scheme.101 Therefore, it was seen that there was a need for affordable 
housing which would be in the reach of the lower and middle-income majority.102  
 
Urbanisation was on the rise as more people began to move away from the country, 
seeking both employment and affordable accommodation in the cities.103 Land 
availability became a problem as there were scarce land resources on which to build 
houses, in relation to the ever increasing population.  Space demands increased as 
people began to occupy larger areas of land than they had in the past.104 There was 
a substantial rise in the cost of urban land and building costs such as labour and 
materials.105 Due to the demand for housing, purchase prices increased.  
 
Sectional title schemes promoted better utilisation of land available for 
accommodation, as it utilised more efficient building methods and had communal 
facilities. These common amenities were used and enjoyed by all of the residents in 
a scheme, fostering closer social relations while still maintaining a sense of privacy. 
The success of the scheme would be determined by the co-operation of all the 
residents in a scheme. This would be ensured by the implementation of rules 
governing the control, management, use and enjoyment of the individual sections 
and the common property, in order to avoid disputes.106   
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It was also perceived that sectional title schemes fulfilled the social need for 
communal living as it provided security and satisfied the psychological need for 
home-ownership.107 The schemes ensured social, economic and political stability by 
binding as much of the population as possible to a fixed and permanent place of 
residence.108 It curbed rising inflation caused by increasing land and building costs, 
by providing for capital investments.109 Existing alternative property institutions such 
as long-term lease, co-ownership based on contract, share-block schemes,110 group 
housing and cluster housing, were considered to be inadequate at providing security 
of tenure and other legal rights associated with traditional ownership.111 
 
2 4 Introduction of legislation  
Sectional title schemes are administered, managed and controlled in accordance 
with the provisions of the promulgated legislation.112 The situation in South Africa, as 
mentioned, necessitated the intervention of the legislature, which in turn introduced a 
statute113 containing all the relevant provisions in order to administer, manage and 
control sectional title schemes effectively. In this section, the reasons for introducing 
legislation will be highlighted, also when and how legislation was introduced, as well 
as the purpose, effect and success of the legislation.  
 
In 1968 a commission of enquiry found that the alternatives to sectional title 
schemes, such as share-block schemes were inadequate. As a result, a commission 
was appointed in 1970 to investigate the situation and identify the inadequacies. In 
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1971 the commission made a recommendation to the State President to the effect 
that a sectional title act should be drafted.114 The Sectional Titles Act115 was 
approved on 10 June 1971 and promulgated on 30 June 1971. However, the 
commencement date was postponed to 30 March 1973 in order to draft the 
regulations and prepare the deeds registry for the registration of sectional title 
schemes. In the meantime, any unforeseen practical problems were solved on an ad 
hoc basis.116  
 
The Sectional Titles Act was modelled to a large degree on the Australian Strata 
Titles Act117 operative in New South Wales, which in turn was largely influenced by 
the German Wohnungseigentumsgesetz.118 The South African legislature also 
incorporated some principles of condominium from the Israeli legislation.119 As with 
New South Wales,120 South Africa soon required a second generation statute.121 
Consequently a bill was published on 2 November 1984. This bill was approved and 
subsequently improved upon by the committee of the Department of Communication 
and Public Works. The new Act was announced on 17 September 1986 and came 
into operation on 1 June 1988.122  
 
Originally the Act dealt with the vertical division of buildings by apportioning units in 
high-rise apartment blocks. Presently it also deals with the form of horizontal 
developments such as duplex apartments, semi-detached houses and communal 
housing. Apart from residential use, sectional title schemes can also be used for 
commercial, industrial and professional purposes or a mixture of the above 
mentioned. In terms of section 60(8) of the Sectional Titles Act,123 the new rules as 
                                            
114
 See Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 397. 
115
 66 of 1971. 
116
 See Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 397. 
117
 Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act 17 of 1961. 
118
 See the Apartment Ownership Act of 1951. See further Cowen DV “The South African Sectional 
Titles Act in historical perspective: an analysis and evaluation” (1973) 6 CILSA 1-38 at 11 and Van 
der Merwe CG “The Sectional Titles Act and the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz” (1974) 7 CILSA 165-
185 at 165. 
119
 See the Co-operative Houses Law of 1952. See further Van der Merwe CG ““The South African 
Sectional Titles Act and Israeli condominium legislation” (1981) 12 CILSA 129-165 at 129. 
120
 Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973. 
121
 See Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 397. 
122
 See Van der Merwe CG Sakereg (2nd ed 1989) 399. 
123
 95 of 1986. 

 
contained in the second generation statute apply automatically to the older schemes 
which were established under the first generation statute. However, where the older 
rules were amended or replaced by either the developer or the body corporate, they 
were applicable insofar as they were not in conflict with the new rules.  
 
The Sectional Titles Act124 made provision for the division of buildings into sections 
and common property, which made it possible to acquire separate ownership in 
sections, along with joint ownership in the common property. This was seen as a 
modification of the traditional concept of ownership of immovable property. The 
legislature realised the need for legislative intervention in order to provide an 
alternative form of title. It has been said that “the advent of sectional ownership has, 
on a balance, been socially and economically beneficial.”125  
 
This legislation126 applied to residential, commercial and industrial sectional title 
schemes. The aim of this legislation was to ensure security of tenure and alleviate 
the housing shortage. The Act made provision for the control, administration and 
management of the common property to be vested in the trustees of the body 
corporate, who were responsible for the enforcement of the rules. Sectional title 
schemes have a communal nature, differing from the individual character of 
traditional ownership. Due to this nature, sectional title schemes need to be 
managed by way of the rules to ensure that the community functions as a 
harmonious whole. 
 
The defects and shortcomings of the first generation statute were to a large extent 
remedied by the second generation statute. An example of a shortcoming in the 
legislation would be that there was no simple, inexpensive and effective means of 
enforcing rules and settling disputes between the owners inter se and between the 
owners and the trustees of the body corporate. The first generation statute was 
influenced to a great extent by the New South Wales Strata Titles Act of 1961, which 
                                            
124
 66 of 1971. 
125
 See Cowen DV “From sectional to airspace tile” 1985 Acta Juridica 333-347 at 335. 
126
 Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971. 

 
did not make provision for any rule enforcement or dispute settling mechanisms 
either.127   
 
2 5 Comparative history  
2 5 1 Introduction 
In this comparative discussion on the historical background of sectional ownership in 
South Africa, reference will be made to Australia, Germany and Israel with regard to 
their similar forms of property subdivision. These countries have some aspects in 
common with the South African model of sectional ownership. They can serve as an 
important example of what the South African legislature has to do in order to ensure 
that the South African statute is as successful and effective as the older and more 
extensive statutes found in these foreign jurisdictions. As mentioned previously, 
South Africa’s first generation statute was modelled to a large degree on the New 
South Wales Strata Titles Act, which in turn was largely influenced by the German 
Wohnungseigentumsgesetz. The South African legislature also incorporated some 
principles of condominium from the Israeli legislation.   
 
The dualistic system was adopted in South Africa, as it had been in Australia and 
Germany.128 In this system, two different types of ownership were linked together, 
such as separate ownership of a section and co-ownership of common property. As 
in South Africa, the alternative forms of ownership found in Germany were 
inadequate to fulfil social and economic needs. Therefore, the German legislator 
introduced the condominium system, which influenced the Australian legislation, 
which has similar rules and regulations as those found in South African sectional 
ownership legislation.  
 
The Israeli Co-operative Houses Law of 1952 influenced the Sectional Titles Act129 
because it was introduced due to similar social and economic needs as those found 
                                            
127
 See Cowen DV “From sectional to airspace tile” 1985 Acta Juridica 333-347 at 341-342. 
128
 See Cowen DV “The South African Sectional Titles Act in historical perspective: an analysis and 
evaluation” (1973) 6 CILSA 1-38 at 36-37. 
129
 66 of 1971. 

 
in South Africa at the time of introduction of sectional title legislation. The Israeli law 
was found to be successful in its enforcement, operation and compliance, and 
therefore serves as a valuable comparative source.  
 
2 5 2 Australia 
2 5 2 1  Introduction  
The Commonwealth of Australia is made up of six states and two major mainland 
territories. The states are New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, 
Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. The territories are the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory. These Australian states and territories all have 
their own jurisdiction concerning the enactment of strata title legislation. Each state 
and territory also has its own legislative framework, but there is some uniformity 
amongst them as they all originated from the legislation introduced in New South 
Wales in 1960.130  
 
In this section, the historical background of the introduction of strata title legislation in 
each state and territory will be discussed. The position in certain jurisdictions will be 
discussed in more detail due to its relevance to the South African model while others 
will be briefly mentioned. In this comparative discussion, the main focus will be on 
the following three states, Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales. The reasons 
for this is that the history of strata title development in Victoria is most similar to that 
of South Africa, the legislation in Queensland makes provision for horizontal 
subdivision of immovable property as can be found in South Africa and statutory 
strata titles originated in New South Wales, which has similar statutes as those found 
in South Africa and is based on vertical and horizontal division of land. 
 
Strata title legislation is continually changing as the government reviews it and 
attempts to meet all of the demands of unit owners and find solutions to the 
challenges that arise from time to time. The original aim behind the introduction of 
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the strata title system of ownership in Australia was to allow people to own their own 
apartments in multi-level or high-rise buildings. Before the introduction of strata titles, 
the most common way to obtain a right in a part of a building was to buy shares in 
the company owning the building. This was known as company title. The company 
would give the shareholder a right to occupy an apartment by issuing a share 
certificate. This form of ownership is still in existence, albeit to a much lesser extent. 
South Africa has a similar form of ownership, known as share-block schemes. As 
with share-block schemes in South Africa, company title was found to be an 
inadequate method of ownership as it formed part of company law and not strata title 
law. This defect made its application more complex and difficult, while offering less 
protection and security to investors.  
 
As with the position of house rules and rules amended by the developer or trustees 
of the body corporate of a sectional title scheme in South Africa,131 strata schemes 
are governed by the rules prescribed by trustees. In the past, each strata scheme 
was responsible for its own rules. Presently, there is a standard model for each state 
and jurisdiction. Strata schemes are statutorily regulated, whereas in South Africa 
the legislation governing sectional title schemes needs to be constitutionally 
compliant. Land reform in Australia is done in a piecemeal fashion and therefore it 
has a more complicated land registration system,132 which has more complex 
problems. In South Africa, there was complete land reform and a simpler land 
registration procedure due to the Constitution and its supreme status. 
 
2 5 2 2  New South Wales 
During the Second World War, construction of new residential dwellings in Australia 
slowed down because the production of building materials was being replaced with 
that which was needed for the war effort. Rent control provisions133 deterred 
developers from investing in new building construction due to the small rental 
returns. Post-war, the increase in capital and labour led to a growing economy, 
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which meant that there was an increased demand for the erection of multi-story 
residential buildings. Flats in these buildings became the new form of sought after 
accommodation, especially in the urban areas.  
 
Statutory strata titles originated in New South Wales. The strata system was 
introduced into Australia in 1961134 and originated from the Torrens system of land 
registration.135 This system was designed to facilitate acquisition of a Torrens system 
title to individual dwellings in a building consisting of multiple dwellings.136 Mutual 
rights and obligations stem from the legislation and the rules which the corporation is 
empowered to make.137 This legislation was the first of its kind and proved to be 
successful, based on the confidence gained by financial institutions and the fact that 
it was adopted by all Australian states and by some foreign jurisdictions.138 Before 
1961, there were, apart from individual ownership, three main schemes in New 
South Wales, namely company title,139 leasehold title140 and tenancy-in-common.141 
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Due to the increased demand for residential accommodation, these schemes 
needed to be replaced with a system more capable of handling the demands.142 
Since 1961 the other states and territories have passed their own strata title 
legislation, albeit under different names.  
 
Before the Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act143 was passed by the New South Wales 
Parliament, it was not possible for an owner to hold a certificate of title for a part of a 
building.144 The early types of schemes did not provide an individual occupant of a 
unit with the security of separate title and ownership.145 The Act enabled the vertical 
and horizontal subdivision of a building into strata lots146 and common property areas 
as well as the provision of a certificate of title, which enabled the transfer of units to 
purchasers.147 Therefore, there was a certificate of title to a section of a building or 
structure. This fostered a sense of freedom and protection that was not available 
before.  
 
Strata title developments were introduced as a consequence of the “desire of many 
people to live within a close proximity of the city centre,”148 and because “home unit 
living offers a release from the immediate care of a garden and home 
maintenance”149 and due to the “generally lower cost of a unit compared with a 
house having similar amenities together with improvements in design [which] has 
seen more families accepting this mode of living.”150  
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Strata title development in New South Wales serves as an example of “structured 
title arrangement.”151 This development is not limited to multi-story buildings 
containing residential units, although this is the most common form, but are more 
diverse. The legislation caters for townhouses, villa homes, retirement villages, free-
standing homes, retail stores, commercial offices, warehouses, industrial units and 
mixed use schemes. There are various types of developments found in New South 
Wales, strata schemes forming part of a community scheme; part building strata 
schemes in a community scheme;152 developments containing a freehold strata 
scheme;153 a leasehold strata scheme154 and a statutory staged strata scheme 
forming part of a community scheme.155 
 
The first generation legislation156 was repealed and replaced with the second 
generation legislation, the Strata Titles Act of 1973 which was introduced due to the 
deficiencies with regard to dispute resolution157 and management in the 1961 
legislation. A complete new set of by-laws158 and a more detailed amendment 
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procedure were introduced. This Act was later repealed and replaced with the third 
generation legislation, the Strata Schemes Management Act159 and the Strata 
Schemes Management Regulation,160 which provided for the management of the 
schemes by an owners’ corporation, which is known as a body corporate in South 
Africa. South Africa’s first generation Sectional Titles Act161 was based on the first 
generation legislation of New South Wales.  
 
The Strata Titles Act of 68 of 1973 was amended and renamed the Strata Schemes 
(Freehold Development) Act 68 of 1973,162 which regulated the development and 
subdivision of strata schemes. The Act defines a strata scheme as “a legally 
recognised community of lot owners, occupiers and other persons having an interest 
in lots as illustrated in a strata plan who have imposed or conferred on them 
numerous duties, restrictions and rights as detailed in the Strata Schemes 
Management Act of 1996, regulations and by-laws.”163 Therefore, a strata scheme 
comprises both the lots and the common property in the strata plan and the people 
who have interests in the lots and common property. The Strata Schemes (Freehold 
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Development) Act provides for ownership of common property, the management and 
maintenance of that common property and for regulating the social interaction of all 
the residents.  
 
Community title schemes provide for the vertical division of land with shared property 
and are governed by the Community Land Development Act164 and the Community 
Land Management Act,165 which was repealed by the Strata Titles (Community 
Land) Amendment Act.166 These statutes operate with traditional strata legislation.167 
This type of development is popular with developers as it facilitates staged 
development, permits a wide range of styles of development, establishes stable and 
efficient mechanisms for common ownership of facilities, provides for centralised 
management and allows for fair apportionment of costs amongst owners.168 
 
A buyer of a lot in a community title scheme becomes a member of the community 
association and must comply with the requirements as provided for in the 
legislation.169 The management statement contains a set of by-laws and regulations 
for management and operational aspects of the community. The management 
statement is binding on the members of the scheme and operates in a similar way to 
the by-laws in a strata scheme,170 which in turn are similar to the conduct rules 
prescribed by the South African Sectional titles Act.  
 
Restrictions on the intended use of the property may arise out of development 
consent conditions or title restrictions. These are imposed by a consent authority or 
under the by-laws contained in a management document such as a community 
management statement or a strata management statement.171 These restrictions will 
be further discussed in chapter three. 
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2 5 2 3  Victoria 
The focus will now be shifted to the state of Victoria. There were two types of flat or 
unit ownership in Victoria before 1967, namely share basis or company flat share172 
which was later replaced by stratum title.173 Unit ownership was introduced because 
the demand for title to or ownership of a flat or the part of a building in which to live 
increased after the World War II as a result of the influx of migrants and returning 
soldiers.174 However, the difficulty in providing this form of security of tenure lay at 
the problem of dividing a multi-story block of flats and to delineate which parts 
belonged to which people and how the surrounding land was to be shared.175  
 
Due to the complexity of the stratum system, a simpler and more appropriate system 
of title for building subdivision was needed. The legislator stepped in and introduced 
legislation through which unit ownership was achieved.176 In 1967 the Strata Titles 
Act177 was enacted. Strata subdivision permitted the vertical subdivision of buildings 
into individual titles for separate strata lots or villa units, with or without common 
property, whether or not the units were on the same level.  Upon registration of a 
strata plan, a body corporate178 comes into existence. The body corporate is similar 
to the service company in a stratum development. However, the body corporate is a 
creature of statute and not subject to the regulations of Corporations law.  Upon 
registration as a proprietor of a unit, each unit owner automatically becomes a 
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member of the body corporate. The registered unit owners are the registered 
proprietors of the common property as tenants in common in shares.  
 
The by-laws set out the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of the body corporate 
and its members. The body corporate is responsible for the control, administration 
and management of the scheme, which is achieved through the implementation of 
by-laws.179 These by-laws have a restrictive nature as they limit the use and 
enjoyment of unit owners in the interests of all the residents in a scheme.  
 
This system of unit ownership is similar to sectional ownership in South Africa with 
regard to the existence and functions and membership of the body corporate, the 
common property and the by-laws. The statutorily prescribed rules, the house rules 
and the rules amended by the developer or trustees of the body corporate which 
govern sectional title schemes in South Africa also restrict the use and enjoyment 
entitlements of sectional owners to ensure the efficient operation of the scheme and 
to maintain harmonious relationships within the scheme. 
 
In 1974 cluster subdivision180 was introduced in Victoria due to the “desire for more 
flexible siting of units on land,”181 the “preservation of special site features”182 and the 
“provision of special interest developments.”183 Cluster titles are a rare occurrence 
and are similar to strata titles with regard to the body corporate, by-laws and 
common property. Cluster titles provide for the vertical division of land.  
 
In 1988 the Subdivision Act184 introduced subdivision title, in which the body 
corporate’s rules govern the owners’ rights to use the common property and the lots. 
It also regulates each owner’s contribution to the maintenance of the scheme. The 
Subdivision Act repealed the Strata Titles Act of 1967 and the Cluster Titles Act of 
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1974. It covers subdivisions of land and buildings in Victoria, which later led to the 
introduction of the Owners Corporation Act.185 Existing company share scheme titles, 
existing stratum titles, existing strata titles186 and cluster titles187 continued to exist 
under the Subdivision Act. 
 
2 5 2 4  Queensland 
The Building Units and Group Titles Act188 provides for the establishment and 
administration of community title schemes in Queensland. Land is subdivided 
according to either a primary plan or a community titles plan. The Act is similar to the 
South African sectional title legislation189 as it provides for the allocation and 
maintenance of common property,190 an elected body corporate that is responsible 
for the management of the building units scheme,191 the payment of levies as part of 
the owners’ contributions and a penalty in the case of non-payment,192 by-laws193 
and dispute resolution procedures.194 The management of these schemes is 
regulated by the Body Corporate and Community Management Act of 1997 and 
Body Corporate and Community Management Regulations.195  
 
2 5 3 Germany 
Germany was chosen as a comparative jurisdiction because the reasons behind the 
introduction of condominiums as an alternative form of housing were the same as in 
South Africa before the legislature intervened and introduced sectional title schemes. 
In both jurisdictions, a growth in population led to a housing shortage and the 
consequent need for affordable housing.  
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In Germany, the possible alternatives to the condominium system, specifically long-
term lease, share-block schemes and Stockwerkseigentum, were inadequate and 
unsatisfactory. The Stockwerkseigentum was a primitive and underdeveloped form 
of apartment ownership, where storeys in a high-rise building were subdivided in 
individual ownership. Due to the individualistic character which it fostered, the 
individual owners were responsible for the management and maintenance of the 
building. No provision was made for a central administrative body to deal with the 
organisation and upkeep of the building. This inevitably led to many disputes 
amongst the owners.  No machinery existed for the settling of disputes or sanctions 
against members who made community life unbearable. This led to the adoption of 
the nickname of Streithaüser.196  Due to these deficiencies, the public viewed this 
institution with suspicion.  
 
The First and Second World Wars caused a serious housing shortage in Germany. 
Coupled with this was an increased desire for home ownership, which led to an 
unfavourable situation where the German legislator had to intervene and reconsider 
apartment ownership as a solution to the crisis. Carl Wirths, a member of the 
German Federal Parliament who is considered to be the founding father197 of the 
condominium system in Germany, initiated the promulgation of this legislation in 
West Germany in 1951.  
 
The Federal Republic of Germany’s Apartment Ownership Act was enacted in 
1951.198 The most important reasons why the German legislator found it necessary 
to introduce a system of condominium, were the shortage of inexpensive 
accommodation, unprecedented population growth in the cities, the demand for 
inexpensive residential land within commuting distance of the big cities, and the rise 
of land and building prices. Therefore the dream of owning a house on a separate 
piece of land199 was not realised by many. 
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By enacting condominium legislation, the legislator attempted to solve the above 
mentioned problems by providing a cheaper form of ownership, such as ownership 
of flats, where the costs were borne collectively by the residents. The main aim of 
the legislator was to satisfy the psychological desire of the majority of families in a 
capitalistic society to own their own homes. They hoped that this would lead to 
social, economic and political stability, which was considered to be very important in 
post-war Germany.200 The secondary aim was to cater for the wealthier members of 
society such as businessmen and to provide for holiday accommodation, industrial 
space and retirement schemes. 
 
2 5 4 Israel 
Israel was chosen as a comparative jurisdiction because many of the provisions in 
the Sectional Titles Act201 were influenced by the Israeli condominium legislation.202 
The law governing co-operative housing in Israel is an example of legislative 
intervention in response to social and economic pressures as well as psychological 
needs.203 Israel found itself in a similar situation as that in South Africa, which 
influenced the need to introduce a system of condominiums,204 namely a higher 
demand for low cost housing caused by the increase in population due to natural 
causes and immigration, the high costs associated with land and building, the 
developers’ unwillingness to build new buildings due to the tenant protection 
legislation, the psychological need for home ownership, rising inflation, a desire for a 
closer social life and security and the lack of any satisfactory existing alternatives to 
condominiums.205  
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The underlying principle in both the South African Sectional Titles Act and the Israeli 
condominium legislation is that the sectional owner or apartment owner becomes the 
individual owner of his section or apartment.206 His powers of use and enjoyment are 
limited by the provisions of the statutorily prescribed restrictions and schedules of 
rules.207 Both statutes provide that the condominium must be managed in terms of 
the rules which regulate the relations between owners and their associated rights 
and duties.208 In both jurisdictions, the rules are important as they regulate the 
administration, use and enjoyment of the condominium.209 
 
In 1952 a Co-operative Houses Law was enacted. After it underwent a number of 
amendments, a consolidated version was issued in 1961.210 The Co-operative 
Houses Law was incorporated into the Israeli Land Law in 1969.211 The Israeli Land 
Law was seen as “durable”212 due to its “soundness in law”213 and “compatibility”214 
with the above mentioned social and economic needs. The small number of cases 
that have come before the courts and the tribunals suggests that the legislative 
framework currently in operation is effective and wide-reaching, which ensures that 
its enforcement, operation and compliance is “generally smooth”.215  
 
2 6  Concluding remarks  
In this chapter there was a comparative discussion of the historical background of 
the immovable property ownership system in South Africa before the introduction of 
separate ownership of a part or section of land or a building as in sectional title 
                                            
206
 See Van der Merwe CG “The South African Sectional Titles Act and the Israeli condominium 
legislation” (1981) 14 CILSA 129-164 at 144. 
207
 See Van der Merwe CG “The South African Sectional Titles Act and the Israeli condominium 
legislation” (1981) 14 CILSA 129-164 at 145. 
208
 See Van der Merwe CG “The South African Sectional Titles Act and the Israeli condominium 
legislation” (1981) 14 CILSA 129-164 at 151. See further s 61 Land Law and s 35(2) Sectional Titles 
Act 95 of 1986. 
209
 See Van der Merwe CG “The South African Sectional Titles Act and the Israeli condominium 
legislation” (1981) 14 CILSA 129-164 at 153. 
210
 See the Co-operative Houses Law (Consolidated Version) of 1961. See further Weisman J “The 
Land Law, 1969: a critical analysis” (1970) 5 Israel LR 379-456 at 442. 
211
 See the Laws of the State of Israel 5729 of 1969. See further Weisman J “The Land Law, 1969: a 
critical analysis” (1970) 5 Israel LR 379-456 at 442. 
212
 See Elman P “Co-operative housing in Israel” (1969) 4 Israel LR 333-363 at 336. 
213
 See Elman P “Co-operative housing in Israel” (1969) 4 Israel LR 333-363 at 336. 
214
 See Elman P “Co-operative housing in Israel” (1969) 4 Israel LR 333-363 at 336. 
215
 See Elman P “Co-operative housing in Israel” (1969) 4 Israel LR 333-363 at 337. 

 
schemes. The common law position was discussed, with reference to its principles of 
ownership216 and the subsequent amendment of these principles. The main reasons 
for the introduction of legislation, making provision for sectional ownership was 
examined, as well as when and how this legislation was introduced. The purpose, 
effect and success of the legislation were also discussed.  
 
The jurisdictions used as a comparative measure, Australia, Germany and Israel, 
were chosen because they faced similar challenges to those found in South Africa, 
which led to the need for an alternative form of land ownership. There were also 
similarities between their systems of separate ownership of a part or section of land 
or a building and sectional ownership in South Africa.  
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that by comparing the currently operative South African 
sectional title legislation and those in operation in other similar jurisdictions, it has 
beneficial value because these legislatures have through experience established 
what works effectively and what needs improvement. Therefore, in doing so, it can 
guide the South African legislature in amending or promulgating sectional title 
legislation. With regard to the general topic, it is very important to have guiding 
principles to follow when deciding what restrictions are applicable to a particular 
scheme based on its nature and purpose. It is also important to have a guide when 
determining how far these restrictions may limit the entitlements of ownership before 
they are considered restrictive in their application and effect.  
 
This comparative historical introduction is further expanded on in the next chapter, 
where the legal nature of the rules governing sectional title schemes will be 
discussed with a comparative perspective. Some of the concepts introduced in this 
chapter will be further explained in the following chapter. 
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3 Comparative description of the rules governing 
sectional title schemes  
3 1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a statutory analysis will be undertaken to describe the different types 
of rules governing sectional title schemes. The focus will be on the legal nature of 
the rules, the limitations on sectional ownership imposed by the rules, examples of 
restrictions, the amendment procedure, the scope of the application and operation of 
the rules, the enforcement mechanisms, the sanctions for non-compliance with the 
rules, the causes of and people involved in disputes and dispute resolution. This 
description will be aided by a comparative survey where relevant, concentrating on 
the jurisdictions that have similar approaches with regard to the above mentioned 
issues and those that have influenced South African legislation, namely Australia217 
and Germany.218  
 
These two jurisdictions were chosen as suitable comparative countries as they will 
serve to identify any shortcomings in the applicable legislation and provide possible 
solutions that may be applied in future. Australia’s strata title219 legislation is similar 
to the South African sectional title legislation and its legal system is similar to that 
found in South Africa.220 This is important, as it will lead to a better understanding of 
how sectional titles fits into the property law scheme as a whole. The need for an 
alternative form of property ownership was similar in South Africa and Germany. 
Policy considerations, such as the social need for housing and security were both 
similar factors in the introduction of sectional title schemes in South Africa and 
Wohnungseigentum in Germany. German legislation makes provision for very 
effective enforcement mechanisms for the rules and sanctions for non-compliance 
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with the rules that serve as an example that South Africa may do well to follow in the 
future.221  
 
The hypothesis set out in the introductory chapter222 will be examined more closely 
in this chapter. When evaluating the model rules as prescribed by the Sectional 
Titles Act223 and those adopted by the trustees of the body corporate of the sectional 
title scheme, it is expected that they restrict the rights and the entitlements of the 
sectional owners and other occupiers of the sections. It is assumed that there is a 
limitation of ownership in the enforcement of the rules and the obligations imposed 
through them. In some instances the rules might exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness and result in unfair discrimination, arbitrary deprivation, unfair 
administrative action or restrictions on access to courts for dispute resolution.  
 
The aim of the discussion in this chapter is to identify the rules governing sectional 
title schemes which might limit ownership, after which it could be established in a 
later chapter224 whether any of these restrictions go beyond that which is considered 
reasonable. It could then be argued whether these rules should be declared invalid 
and unenforceable due to the fact that they are contrary to the fundamental rights 
entrenched in the Constitution.225 
 
3 2 Rules governing a sectional title scheme 
3 2 1 Introduction  
The focus of the discussion will be on the rules which are statutorily prescribed in the 
Sectional Titles Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, known as the model or 
standard rules. They provide for the control, management, administration, use and 
enjoyment of the sections226 and the common property227 in the scheme.228 The rules 
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from this source fall within two classes, namely the management rules229 and the 
conduct rules,230 which will be discussed fully. The Act, the model management rules 
and the conduct rules operate within a hierarchy, with the Act being the supreme 
statute and the conduct rules not being allowed to conflict with the management 
rules.  
 
A sectional title scheme is controlled and managed by the rules from the moment the 
body corporate is established.231 The body corporate is established after the opening 
of the sectional title register when the developer alienates the first unit.232 Secondly, 
there are the rules that are adopted, substituted, amended, added to and or repealed 
by either the developer or by the trustees of the body corporate by resolution.233 
When submitting an application for the opening of a sectional title register at the 
deeds registry, the developer must submit a conveyancer’s certificate providing that 
the rules prescribed in terms of the Act234 are applicable to the scheme in question. 
The developer may substitute, add to, amend or repeal the prescribed management 
and conduct rules to the extent that he is allowed in terms of the Act.235  
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The prescribed management and conduct rules can be substituted, added to, 
amended or repealed by resolution of the body corporate.236 The body corporate 
must notify the registrar of deeds of any rules substituted, added to, amended or 
repealed.237 The rules will come into operation at the date of filing the notice at the 
deeds registry.238 The prescribed conduct rules may be substituted, added to, 
amended or repealed provided that they are not irreconcilable with the prescribed 
management rules.239 Any management or conduct rule made by either the 
developer or the body corporate must be reasonable and apply equally to all 
sectional owners and other occupiers of units that are put to substantially the same 
purpose.240 Thirdly, there are those rules that are adopted by the trustees, known as 
the house rules, which may not be contrary to either the Act or the prescribed 
management and conduct rules.241 The body corporate must make available the 
rules in operation on application by a sectional owner or other occupier.242 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a comparative survey will be used to 
discuss the similar approaches to the issues surrounding sectional title schemes in 
other jurisdictions. Australian strata title schemes are similar in nature to South 
African sectional title schemes, and as such, serve as a good comparative example. 
The Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act243 was the first to address horizontal 
subdivision of buildings in Australia. The Strata Schemes Management Act244 and 
the Strata Schemes Management Regulation245 govern the management of strata 
title schemes in Australia.246 In New South Wales, by-laws are applicable to strata 
schemes regardless of the nature of the scheme.247 The legislation does not limit 
matters for which by-laws may be enacted. However, they may not prohibit 
occupation of a lot by children in a residential scheme or prohibit the keeping of a 
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dog as a guide or hearing dog by an owner or occupier in a strata scheme.248 These 
prohibitions will be discussed at a later stage in this discussion.  
 
3 2 2 Management rules  
As mentioned previously, the rules governing a sectional title community fall within 
two classes, the first being the management rules. These rules are prescribed by 
regulation and they regulate the activities of the trustees and the members of the 
body corporate, with regard to the administration of the scheme. The model 
management rules deal with matters concerning the trustees of the body 
corporate,249 such as their appointment by election,250 their meetings,251 their 
functions, powers and duties,252 each member of the body corporate’s levy 
contributions,253 any luxurious or non-luxurious improvements on the common 
property,254 the keeping of annual financial records,255 the appointment, powers and 
duties of the managing agent,256 meetings of the owners,257 duties of the owners and 
occupiers of the sections258 and the determination of disputes through the use of 
arbitration as provided for by the Amendment Act.259  
 
3 2 3 Conduct rules  
The second class of rules governing a sectional title scheme are the conduct 
rules,260  which are also prescribed by regulation. They determine the entitlements of 
use and the duties of sectional owners with regard to their individual sections and 
their share in the common property. These model rules deal with matters such as the 
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keeping of pets,261 refuse disposal,262 vehicles parked on the common property,263 
any damage, alterations and additions to the common property,264 the scheme’s 
external appearance,265 any signs and notices advertised on the common 
property,266 littering,267 laundry,268 the storage of inflammable material and other 
dangerous acts,269 the letting of units270 and the eradication of pests.271 
 
3 2 4  House rules 
There is no statutory provision permitting the creation of house rules. In fact, the 
explicit provision for the model management and conduct rules could be seen as 
impliedly excluding other methods of rule-making.272 Unlike the statutorily prescribed 
rules, the implementation and enforcement of house rules is not controlled, thereby 
undermining the certainty and protection afforded to owners. This might suggest that 
a strict approach should be followed which does not allow these rules in sectional 
title schemes.273 However, these rules, which are adopted by the trustees of the 
body corporate, regulate the control, use, safety and cleanliness of the common 
property274 and are seen as more flexible than those that are statutorily prescribed. 
Therefore, they serve as effective tools to regulate practical problems as they arise 
in the daily management of the scheme, as they may be amended by the trustees at 
short notice.  
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The trustees are empowered to do all things reasonably necessary for the control, 
management and administration of the common property. Therefore, by adopting 
house rules, they are exercising their statutory powers. House rules are enforceable 
when they comply with two requirements of legitimacy. They must be an exercise of 
the trustees’ powers of control over the common property or permission given by the 
trustees exercising their discretion.275 However, they may not be objectionable in the 
way that they restrict the rights of sectional owners.276 
 
The Strata Titles Management Act of 1996 makes provision for house rules in strata 
schemes in New South Wales. When the owners’ corporation277 is unable to obtain a 
special resolution to enable an addition to be made to the by-laws278 found in 
Schedule 1 of the Act, they pass a Schedule 2 by-law. “This attempted means of 
equating a house rule to a by-law may achieve the desired result for the purpose of 
providing for minor matters in the administration of the scheme, where all the 
participants in the scheme are prepared to acknowledge and comply with the house 
rules.”279 Owners and occupiers of lots in strata title schemes may voluntarily comply 
with house rules, but if a dispute arises due to non-compliance with the rules, no 
power is vested in the Commissioner to order compliance with these rules.  
 
3 3 Legal nature of the rules  
3 3 1 An introduction to the legal nature of rules  
The legal nature of private-law institutions, such as sectional title schemes, are 
usually described as contractual,280 the basis of the scheme being a contract entered 
into between owners inter se and between the owners and the body corporate. 
                                            
275
 S 38(j) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
276
 See Wood-Bodley MC “‘House rules’ in sectional title schemes – are they ultra vires?” (2003) 120 
SALJ 602-609 at 605. 
277
 Legal entity, statutorily established which comprises all the owners of the lots in a strata scheme 
and is responsible for the management of the scheme.  
278
 Rules governing the day-to-day management of the strata scheme. 
279
 Collins DA and Jackson RJ Strata title units in New South Wales (1974) 72. 
280
 See Pienaar GJ “Die regsaard van privaatregtelike reëls en regulasies” (1991) 54 THRHR 400-413 
at 400 and Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5th ed 2006) 464. 
	
 
According to Spoelstra J in Wiljay Investments v Body Corporate Bryanston 
Crescent:281 
“[t]he rules set out in Schedule 1 of the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 are not intended to 
define or limit the ownership of individual owners of sections, units, or common property. 
The rules, read with the provisions of the Act, contain a constitution or the domestic 
statute of the Body Corporate. In this sense, it could properly be construed as containing 
the terms of an agreement, between owners inter se, and between owners on the one 
hand, and the Body Corporate on the other hand, providing for the use, enjoyment and 
maintenance of the property which forms the object of the hybrid rights of ownership 
created by the Act. Arrangements of this nature have never been considered as 
servitudes of any nature.” 
 
In Lottering v Palm,282 the court confirmed what was said in Wiljay Investments v 
Body Corporate Bryanston Cresent, namely that the rules of a body corporate should 
properly be construed as containing the terms of an agreement between owners 
inter se and between owners and the body corporate. The agreement intended to 
provide peaceful, reasonably certain and presumably the most satisfactory 
arrangement possible under the circumstances for the use, enjoyment and 
maintenance of the property which forms the object of the rights.  
 
In the Lottering case, neighbours in a sectional title scheme were in dispute 
regarding the position of the boundary between the two units. Lottering had for many 
years been in possession of the disputed area. Palm wanted to build a carport and 
obtained permission from the body corporate to extend the boundary wall. 
Permission was granted and construction on the retaining wall commenced. The wall 
clearly encroached on the area of which Lottering had been in possession and as 
such sought demolition of the wall. Palm argued that Lottering, as a member of the 
body corporate and as a subscriber to the rules of the body corporate, had impliedly 
consented to the permission granted by the body corporate to Palm. The court held 
that the permission was a creation of a right and in the absence of Lottering’s clear 
consent, Palm was obliged to approach the court to enforce the right. Palm’s failure 
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to do so amounted to her taking the law into her own hands and was subsequently 
unlawful. The court granted the demolition order temporarily pending the resolution 
of the boundary dispute between the parties. 
 
However, despite the authority of the Wiljay Investments v Body Corporate 
Bryanston Cresent decision, it might be more accurate to describe the legal nature of 
the rules by referring to the fact that they were created by the owners as the 
objective law of an autonomous private law community. Therefore, the rules can be 
classified as the internal law of the community of owners as a body corporate.283 
This approach is followed for the rules that are substituted, added to, amended and 
repealed by the developer initially and later by the trustees of the body corporate, 
whereas the Sectional Titles Act statutorily prescribes rules in its regulations. These 
rules are binding on the sectional owners and other occupiers as will be discussed 
later.  
 
To further the argument that the rules are not contractual in nature, one can look at 
various aspects surrounding the establishment and operation of a sectional title 
scheme. Firstly, the body corporate is established without the need for the 
conclusion of a contract regulating its existence and operation.284 Secondly, the 
membership of the owners to the body corporate is not contractual in nature as they 
become members of the body corporate automatically when they obtain a legal right 
to their units.285 Therefore, the internal relationship between owners as members of 
the body corporate cannot be contractual in nature. Thirdly, a sectional title scheme 
is controlled and managed by the rules from the moment the body corporate is 
established. This has the implication that potential owners who are not yet members 
of the body corporate and have not yet reached consensus regarding the rules, are 
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also bound by the rules when they subsequently become owners.286 Therefore, it is 
incorrect to refer to them as being contractual in nature. 
 
Another view is that the rules are delegated legislation.287 As such, they have to pass 
the test of reasonableness. In order to determine this, the individual circumstances of 
each case must be considered as factors. If they are unreasonable, the rules will be 
invalid and ultra vires as their enforcement would then lead to oppression, partiality 
and inequality.288 However, this view is difficult to apply as the management organ of 
the community of owners, the body corporate, represented by the trustees, is not a 
public-law state or administrative body. The members of the body corporate are 
private persons, therefore the scheme is not managed in the light of public 
interests.289 
 
The rules establish a clear and binding framework in which both the management of 
the sectional title scheme and relationships between sectional owners and occupiers 
are governed.290 The rules determine the nature of the scheme and thus which 
conditions are suitable to the scheme. The seller of a unit must provide the 
prospective purchaser with a copy of the rules governing the sectional title 
scheme.291 As mentioned previously, the rules are not contractual in nature and as 
such are not provided to the purchaser on the basis of a contractual agreement 
based on mutual consent between the purchaser and the body corporate. Instead, 
the rules serve as a mechanism whereby the purchaser undertakes to behave in a 
manner that will not prejudice the harmonious community or the efficient operation of 
the sectional title scheme.  The purchaser must read and agree to this “fine print” 
and not behave recklessly by ignoring it. He must abide by the rules and act 
accordingly. The purchaser must question any conditions that he believes are 
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contrary to his constitutional rights before entering into the contract of sale with the 
seller and the contractual relationship with the body corporate of the sectional title 
scheme in which he is purchasing a unit. Once the unit is purchased, such owner 
must apply to court to have the offending management or conduct rule set aside. If 
the rules are seen as reasonable they are acceptable. However, if they are 
unreasonable, they are considered to be unacceptable and unenforceable.292  
 
The rules must be comprehensive in order to provide for efficient control and 
management of the scheme while not attempting to cover “every conceivable aspect 
of life in the scheme”.293 However, the rules should be capable of providing for a 
penalty of some kind in the event of a persistent breach. If the rules over-reach their 
aim of regulating the behaviour of owners and other residents, they may be “flouted 
with impunity”,294 which will lead to a situation in which the rules are ignored by the 
owners and occupiers and therefore cease to be a valuable mechanism of control 
and management by the trustees. 
 
While nobody wants to impose unreasonable restrictions, owners and trustees of 
sectional schemes must always be aware that the common property belongs to 
every owner and that every owner has some control over what happens to it. 
Reasonable people do not often object to reasonable changes, but when 
unauthorised changes become “weapons between unreasonable people” the body 
corporate must intervene.295 The Act296 requires that the rules be applied reasonably 
and equally between sectional owners who use their units for substantially the same 
purpose. Rules may therefore not be adapted in order to suit the needs of an 
individual or certain group of sectional owners as this would be an unreasonable 
application. 
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3 3 2 Limitation of the entitlements of ownership  
3 3 2 1 Introduction  
The exercise of a sectional title owner’s entitlements, as well as the entitlements of 
other occupiers, is limited by the entitlements of other sectional owners and 
occupiers to a much larger extent than with common law ownership. The rules 
restrict the common law principle of plena in re potestas, in terms of which the owner 
of the land may exercise his entitlements of use and enjoyment fully. Due to these 
restrictions, some legal academics have followed the view that sectional title 
ownership is not “real” or “genuine”297 ownership but rather a limited real right. The 
reason for this view was that the traditional view of ownership was incorrectly seen 
as absolute, whereas ownership of a sectional title unit has restrictions placed on it. 
In a dense and intensified community such as that found in sectional title schemes, 
rules which limit the entitlements of ownership are needed in order to ensure order 
and harmony298 within the community of owners and residents. Therefore, this view 
carries no weight in light of the developments of the property concept in modern 
times, justified by the fact that a sectional title scheme is a unique development and 
ownership of this form of property is genuine ownership. 
 
This confirms the principle that ownership in general as well as sectional ownership 
is neither absolute nor individualistic, but must rather always be exercised by taking 
the rights of others into consideration as seen in the Roman law maxim, sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas. This principle means that a sectional owner or occupier can 
use and enjoy their section as long as they do not infringe upon the rights of other 
sectional owners or occupiers or be in conflict with the public interest in general. 
Therefore, the sectional owner or occupier must act in the interests of good 
neighbourliness and not inconvenience, prejudice or abuse the rights of other 
sectional owners. However, if the restriction is abnormal or not reasonable to 
tolerate, there is a remedy available, such as an interdict or a claim for damages.  
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There are many different types of restrictions on sectional ownership, the most 
important of which will be looked at more closely, namely the obligations and 
restrictions imposed by the Sectional Titles Act,299 the prescribed rules300 and 
restrictions imposed by developers and / or the body corporate,301 common law 
nuisance,302 existing servitudes,303 real rights,304 restrictive conditions on the 
sectional plan and restrictions imposed by implied reciprocal servitudes.305 
  
Every member of the body corporate must be aware of and considerate towards the 
rights of other owners and occupiers of the scheme because of the close proximity of 
residents of the scheme and their shared use and enjoyment of the common 
property. The rules must not be seen as being restrictions on “individual liberty”306 
but as “guarantees of the common right”307 of all members of the body corporate to 
the use and enjoyment of their sections and the protection of the property interests of 
their investments. 
 
3 3 2 2 Obligations and duties of the sectional owner  
The point of departure is that the owner obtains full ownership of his section, 
although his use and enjoyment of his section is restricted by the rules in a manner 
that ensures equality and harmony amongst all the members of the sectional title 
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community.308 The Sectional Titles Act309 does not intend to impose unreasonably 
onerous conditions on the owners and occupiers as it is not necessary to do so. 
Most owners and occupiers respect the wishes and privacy of the other residents 
and generally act in a considerate manner, complying with the rules. However, for 
the less “neighbourly”310 minority who cause “disharmony”,311 a management rule312 
prescribes dispute and arbitration procedures which may be used against them. In 
order to ensure financial stability and social harmony within the community, there 
must be effective enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance and efficient 
sanctions in the case of non-compliance.   
 
The owners and other duly authorised occupiers have the following financial and 
non-financial obligations to comply with.313 They must pay reasonable levies which 
will cover their individual share of the maintenance and administrative costs,314 they 
must keep their section in a good state of repair,315 they may not use their sections in 
a manner that is or causes a nuisance to any other resident in the scheme,316 they 
may not damage the reputation317 or prejudice the aesthetic or harmonious 
appearance of the scheme318 and they may not use their unit for any purpose other 
than what is indicated on the sectional plan unless they obtain the written consent of 
all the other owners in the scheme. This permission may not be unreasonably 
withheld and if it is, the body corporate must provide good reasons for doing so. 
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The management and conduct rules regulating a sectional title scheme have a 
restrictive effect, and therefore place a limitation on the rights of use and enjoyment 
of the owners and occupiers. The rules that will be looked at more closely are the 
following: the conduct rule preventing a sectional owner or occupier from keeping a 
pet without the written consent of the trustees,319 the harmonious appearance rule,320 
the rules regulating noise and nuisance,321 and the conduct and management rules 
regulating the use and misuse of a section.322 
 
3 3 2 3  Prohibition on the keeping of pets without the written consent 
of the trustees 
When considering an application to keep pets, the trustees should exercise their 
discretion and should not unreasonably refuse permission. They should also 
consider whether any special circumstances would warrant a departure from the 
general policy of the scheme.323 The factors that they could take into consideration 
when determining whether the pet would constitute a nuisance would include the 
size, nature and temperament of the pet. The trustees should also consider whether 
any of the other residents would be inconvenienced or their peaceful use and 
enjoyment of their sections disturbed and whether or not there have been similar 
pets allowed in the scheme before. The trustees may impose conditions to be 
complied with when allowing the owner or occupier to keep a pet and in the event of 
non-compliance, the trustees may withdraw their approval. An absolute prohibition 
on the keeping of pets would only be allowed in exceptional circumstances as it is 
contrary to the sectional owner’s right to use and enjoyment of his section. It is within 
the power of the trustees’ discretion to limit the number and kind of pets allowed per 
section. However, the trustees are not allowed to unreasonably withhold their 
consent.  
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Relevant case law would be the case of Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge 
Scheme v Dorse.324 Dorse was the owner and occupier of a unit in a sectional title 
scheme. She kept a small dog in her unit. However, she had not sought permission 
from the trustees of the body corporate to keep the dog in the scheme. The 
managing agents of the scheme requested her to house her dog elsewhere. Dorse 
had replied by letter to the body corporate requesting permission to keep the dog. 
The rules pertaining to the scheme provided that no animals, except birds in cages, 
could be kept in a section or on the common property unless expressly permitted in 
writing by the trustees. Dorse’s request had been considered at a meeting of the 
trustees but it had been decided that no exception could be made to the rules in her 
case and that she was to find alternative accommodation for the dog. Dorse had not 
done so, which had prompted an application to court by the body corporate for an 
order that Dorse remove the dog from her unit. Dorse opposed the application and 
brought a counter-application to review and set aside the decision of the trustees to 
refuse her application to keep a dog in her unit and for an order that she be allowed 
to keep the dog in terms of specified conditions.  
 
Dorse contended that the trustees' refusal to grant permission had been a result of 
an unwarranted adherence to a fixed principle and contemplation of irrelevant 
considerations such as the creation of a precedent without according due attention to 
certain particular circumstances, namely that the dog did not bark, was carried 
whenever it left the unit and did not in any way constitute a nuisance to Dorse’s 
neighbours. Dorse contended further that in the circumstances the trustees' decision 
had been so grossly unreasonable as to warrant an inference that they had not 
applied their minds to the facts of the matter or the applicable rules.  
 
The court held that in terms of the rules of the scheme, the trustees had been vested 
with judicial discretion to grant or refuse permission to keep pets in units or on the 
common property. It appeared from the evidence that the body corporate had 
adopted a policy that permission for keeping a pet should not be granted unless 
special circumstances warranted a departure from the general policy. As the trustees 
                                            
324
 1999 (2) SA 512 (D).  
 
	
 
had refused permission for a dog to remain on the premises, it had to be assumed 
that they had found no special circumstances in Dorse’s case to warrant a departure 
from the general policy. However, it was not apparent on what grounds the trustees 
had made this finding. The only impression which could be gained from the evidence 
was that the issues of policy and precedent had been dominant, if not decisive 
factors governing the exercise of the trustees' discretion. The trustees offered no 
reasons why it was considered that the size, nature and temperament of the dog nor 
Dorse’s contentions that the dog did not constitute a nuisance and was never on the 
common property, were not good enough reasons to grant permission to Dorse to 
keep the dog. These were highly relevant considerations and should have been 
taken into account.   
 
The court held that the question of precedent was not a relevant consideration and 
should not have influenced the trustees' decision. Each request for permission to 
keep an animal had to be considered on its own merits and a decision had to be 
based on the facts and circumstances relevant to the particular case. Refusal to 
grant permission purely because it would create a precedent would be tantamount to 
failure to consider and decide an application on its own merits and would result in a 
refusal to depart from the general policy of not granting permission. The court held 
further that it was apparent from the rules of the scheme that a restriction on the 
keeping of animals was designed to avoid causing a nuisance to other residents of 
the scheme. However, in the case of Dorse’s dog, there could never be a danger of 
nuisance as it, according to Dorse, did not bark and was never allowed on the 
common property. The court held that there could be no conceivable reason why the 
trustees could not have considered that the circumstances relating to Dorse’s 
particular dog were not such as to warrant the granting of permission for it to be kept 
in the unit in terms of the conditions to which Dorse was prepared to agree. It was 
apparent from the trustees' conduct that they had taken into account irrelevant 
considerations such as precedent and ignored relevant circumstances pertaining to 
the particular dog and whether its presence in Dorse’s unit could possibly constitute 
a nuisance. The trustees’ decision was so grossly unreasonable as to warrant an 
inference that they had failed to apply their minds to the matter at hand. On this 
		
 
basis, the trustees' decision was reviewable. The body corporate’s application was 
dismissed and Dorse’s counter-application was granted. 
 
The Strata Schemes Management Act of 138 of 1996325 regulates the keeping of 
pets in strata schemes in New South Wales. The Act provides in its by-laws that pets 
may only be kept in strata schemes with the consent of the owners’ corporation. 
Consent may be sought by writing a letter to the secretary of the owners’ 
corporation. In this letter, the lot owner wishing to keep a pet should describe the pet 
referring to its age, size and appearance and disposition. They should note whether 
they are a responsible pet owner and whether they were allowed to keep a pet 
previously in a similar scheme. If so, references from the previous owners’ 
corporation should be provided. The lot owner could also investigate whether any 
pets were allowed in the scheme previously in order to serve as persuasive 
precedent if needed.  
 
Should the owners’ corporation refuse to consent to the keeping of a pet, the lot 
owner needs to determine whether the consent was unreasonably withheld. If so, 
they can refer the matter for mediation or adjudication. If a pet is kept without the 
consent of the owners’ corporation, they can serve a notice requiring the lot owner to 
comply with the relevant by-law. If the lot owner fails to comply, the owners’ 
corporation can apply for an order from the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal 
for a fine to be paid by the owner or occupier of the lot. If the owner or occupier does 
not comply with this order, a further penalty will be imposed.326 If the owners’ 
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corporation grants their consent to the keeping of an animal on the lot, the owner 
must ensure that the presence of the pet does not become a nuisance. 
 
3 3 2 4 Harmonious appearance rule 
This rule states that an owner or occupier may not do anything which will 
detrimentally affect the aesthetic appeal of the scheme by making their section or 
exclusive use area look different from others in the scheme.327 This is an absolute 
prohibition. Therefore, the written consent of the trustees of the body corporate 
cannot be obtained in order to circumvent this rule. Most residential sectional title 
schemes consist of sections built to a higher density than that which is usually found 
in single, freehold developments, therefore strict visual control must be enforced and 
is usually achieved by designing around a particular design and colour theme. This 
results in a harmonious appearance. Therefore, this rule was written in the interest of 
visual harmony. 
  
3 3 2 5  Rules regulating noise and nuisance 
The problem of noise and nuisance is subjective and can easily be resolved through 
the exercise of co-operation. Therefore, it is incumbent on every owner to be 
sensitive to the needs of their neighbours. However, if the problem persists, the 
matter will be referred to arbitration or mediation in terms of the prescribed 
management rule.328 The duty rests on purchasers to be aware of the potential for 
noise within a scheme.329 Some types of noise are not easily controlled.330 
Therefore, the sections that are close to the source of noise will depreciate in value. 
When making the decision as to whether an act constitutes a nuisance, the trustees 
of the body corporate must take all the relevant circumstances into consideration 
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before concluding that the owner or occupier of a unit has contravened a prescribed 
rule. 331   
 
The Strata Titles Act332 contains an express rule against nuisance created by noise 
which states that “a proprietor or occupier of a lot shall not upon the parcel create 
any noise likely to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of the proprietor or occupier 
of another lot or of any person lawfully using the common property.”333 It also 
contains a provision whereby an owner must ensure that the floor covering of his 
apartment is sufficient to prevent the transmission of noise likely to disturb the 
peaceful enjoyment of the owner or occupier of another section.334 
 
3 3 2 6 Rules regulating the use and misuse of sections 
In a similar way as with noise and nuisance regulation, controlling use and misuse of 
sections is problematic because there is a high degree of subjectivity involved in 
most body corporate decisions on this issue. The trustees, acting in the interests of 
the body corporate, must exercise their discretion and take all the relevant 
circumstances into consideration when making the decision as to whether to grant 
their consent to the change of use335 of a particular section upon the request of the 
owner. All the other owners and occupiers residing in the scheme must agree in 
writing to the change of use.336  
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The factors influencing the trustees’ decision are the extent of the noise that will be 
generated by the use of the section,337 the nuisance that will be caused,338 and the 
effects on the safety of the scheme. An owner or resident may not do anything that 
will damage the reputation of the building.339 The types of use which will be 
characterised as injurious to the reputation of the building will vary depending on the 
values of the community in question at the time of such use. 
 
Relevant case law would be Bonthuys v Scheepers,340 where the owner of a unit in 
residential sectional title scheme wished to operate a hairdressing salon from her 
residential unit. Scheepers, the owner, was unable to secure written consent of all 
the other owners in the sectional title scheme. Scheepers instituted proceedings in 
the Magistrates’ Court, relying on section 44(2)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act, which 
provides that any owner which is of the opinion that any refusal of consent of another 
owner is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to her, may make an application to 
court. Scheepers was successful in obtaining an order allowing her to operate a 
hairdressing salon from her residential unit.  
 
The other owners in the residential scheme took the Magistrates’ Court’s judgment 
on appeal to the High Court. The judge made a ruling that the magistrate had 
misdirected himself by attaching too much weight and consideration to Scheepers’ 
personal circumstances. This had been done to the exclusion of the interests of the 
other residential unit holders who had acquired their units for residential purposes 
only, as expressly provided for on registered sectional title plan. The High Court set 
aside the order made by the Magistrates’ Court. The result was that Scheepers could 
no longer operate a business from her home due to fact that the prejudice suffered 
by all the other residents of sectional title scheme far outweighed the prejudice 
suffered by her as the applicant. The High Court weighed up the effect that such a 
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business operation would have on the peace and tranquillity of the sectional title 
scheme and considered the fact that instead of increasing the value of the scheme, 
such consent would adversely affect the sectional title scheme. Scheepers’ personal 
circumstances did not justify this departure. 
 
Another relevant case is Cujé-Jakoby v Kaschub,341 where the applicant, a sectional 
owner conducted the business of hiring out residential units on behalf of other 
owners. Cujé also operated a laundry in a converted garage. Fellow residents 
complained of the nuisance342 caused by the noise from the laundry. Cujé relocated 
the business to other converted garages. The body corporate had approved the 
change of use and the conversion. All the owners,343 excepting Kaschub, had 
approved the change of use and the conversion. At an annual general meeting held 
previously, Kaschub had voted in favour of the change of use, but had suggested 
that the laundry be moved and a side door closed. However, Kaschub was not 
prepared to undertake to withdraw her objection at this stage if such suggested 
changes were made. Cujé hesitated because of Kashub’s lack of guarantee and 
reservation of rights.  
 
When deciding whether a refusal of consent is unfairly or unreasonably prejudicial, 
unjust or inequitable, one reads in conduct which can be seen as being a departure 
from the acceptable standards of fair play. The reason that Kaschub’s refusal could 
be seen as unreasonable is that on a previous occasion, she had consented to the 
change of use as well as the fact that she herself had changed the use of her own 
garage. The court found that the objections were fanciful and relied on certain bald 
statements such as the apparent negative impact that such use would have on her 
security, her right to privacy and the value of the property. The court found that on 
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 2007 (3) SA 345 (C). See a discussion on the case in Van der Merwe CG Sectional titles, share 
blocks and time-sharing Vol 1 (2010) 8.10-8.11. 
342
 S 44(1)(e) of the Sectional Titles Act, provides that an owner shall not use his section or exclusive 
use area or permit to be used in such a manner or for such a purpose as shall cause a nuisance to 
any occupier of a section. 
343
 S 44(1)(g) and (2)(a)-(b) provides that the intended purpose must be gleaned from registered 
sectional plan unless written consent of all owners is obtained. If consent is refused, leading to it 
being unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, such person may approach court for order of which 
court deems just and equitable. 
 


 
the issue of security, having strangers come into a scheme to fulfil such work as 
done by Cujé would negatively affect her security. In terms of her right to privacy, it is 
an inevitable consequence of living in a sectional title scheme with common areas 
that people will be moving around on such common property. Regarding the reduced 
value, the availability of an efficient on-site and centralized letting arrangement would 
have the likely effect of making the properties in question more attractive to potential 
owners wishing for part-time residential occupation.  
 
Kaschub also argued that the use for commercial purposes was unlawful due to fact 
that building works were done without approved plans. Cujé had obtained approval 
for the conversion by the home-owners association and had, therefore, proceeded 
with the alterations in terms of the plan which he had assumed would be approved 
by the body corporate. The court decided that Kaschub’s refusal to grant Cujé her 
consent would be prejudicial and that by asking Cujé to move the business to 
alternative premises would have a devastating impact on the business and on those 
people benefiting from the services provided. The decisive factor in the court’s 
decision was Kaschub’s attitude, as she had consented to the proposed conversion 
but had then proceeded to refuse to give her written consent. Kaschub had wanted a 
compromise. However, she did not wish to abide by it. Such conduct was seen as 
grossly unreasonable. Therefore, the court found that Kaschub was deemed to have 
given written consent to use of particular sections of the sectional title scheme for 
commercial purposes. 
 
Another relevant case is Body Corporate of the Tuzla Mews Scheme v Yang,344 
which dealt with civil liability for non-compliance with an arbitration award in favour of 
the body corporate. A dispute arose between a sectional title owner, Yang and the 
body corporate about the improper use of property in the sectional title scheme. The 
dispute arose after Yang had erected a structure on the common property without 
the body corporate’s permission. Yang committed a further offence by using two of 
his units for industrial purposes when they had clearly been marked as residential 
sections.  
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The body corporate sought committal of Yang for contempt for failing to comply with 
the court order, namely the arbitration award. The body corporate made an 
application to have the award confirmed as an order of court in order to enforce it. 
The court held that Yang’s building activity on the common property in the 
development scheme was a contravention of many of the provisions of Sectional 
Titles Act and ordered Yang to restore the common property to its prior condition. 
Yang was afforded a period of 60 days to obtain consent of each owner to authorise 
him to utilise the two units for industrial purposes. The court provided that should the 
requisite consents not be given by each owner within the time limit, Yang would be 
obliged to restore the units to residential properties. The application was dismissed 
on the grounds that Yang had acted in contravention to the provisions of the 
Sectional Titles Act. 
 
3 4 Amendment and operation of the management and conduct 
rules 
The prescribed management and conduct rules, as set out by the developer, are of 
force and are binding on the body corporate, all owners and occupiers of the 
sections from the moment that the body corporate is established.345 In order to 
prevent later problems when amending the rules at the members’ meeting, the 
developer must ensure that the rules are suitable for the type of scheme in 
question.346 When applying for the opening of a sectional title register, the developer 
can replace these management rules with others more comprehensive and better 
suited to the needs of the sectional title scheme.347  
 
The management rules may be supplemented or repealed by the body corporate 
from time to time by unanimous resolution,348 while the conduct rules may be 
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supplemented, amended or repealed by the body corporate by special resolution,349 
provided they are not irreconcilable with the prescribed management rules.350 The 
rules can only be amended to the extent allowed by the regulations and some cannot 
be amended at all.351 The amendment must be reasonable and equally applicable to 
all owners who use the units for essentially the same purpose.352  
 
Before the 1997 amendments,353 if the management rules were later amended by 
the body corporate, the body corporate had to give notice of the amendment, in the 
prescribed manner, to the Registrar, who would decide whether the rules imposed 
any obligations or conditions which detracted from the sectional owner’s rights or 
whether they were in conflict with the Sectional Titles Act or the regulations and 
should therefore be rejected.354 Such amended rules would only come into operation 
once the amendment was stated on the certificate and handed in with the sectional 
plan. The amended provision355 states that the Registrar is no longer obliged to note 
any substitution, addition, amendment or repeal of rules against the conveyancer’s 
certificate, relating to the rules which must accompany the developer’s application for 
registration of the sectional plan and the opening of a sectional title register. Such a 
substitution, addition, amendment or repeal of rules comes into operation on the date 
on which the Registrar files the notification of such a change.356 The body corporate 
has to notify the Registrar of any supplementation, amendment or repeal of the 
rules.357 The body corporate must make available to all the owners or the 
empowered party, all the rules in operation at that time to ensure that they are aware 
                                                                                                                                       
rules through a unanimous resolution, in substitution of the rules contained in Annex 8 and 9 of the 
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of the rules governing the use and enjoyment of their section and their share in the 
common property.358 
 
3 5 Scope of application of the rules 
The rules govern the control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of the 
individual sections and the common property.359 They impose binding duties and 
obligations on all residents.360 They do not apply to visitors. The rules do not bind 
outsiders directly, but the owners of the unit can be held responsible, in terms of the 
rules, for their visitors’ conduct, as they are required to ensure that their guests 
comply with the rules governing the scheme.361 In terms of the strata titles by-laws, 
the owners and residents must ensure that their visitors do not behave, in a lot or on 
the common property, in a manner which may disturb the peaceful enjoyment of any 
other residents.362  
 
3 6 Enforcement of the rules 
3 6 1 Introduction 
The rules governing a sectional title scheme are enforceable against all the owners 
and occupiers of a section in a scheme. Effective enforcement mechanisms are 
necessary in order to ensure that there is compliance with the rules, social harmony 
and financial stability within the scheme. Here, mention will be made of who enforces 
the rules, the mechanisms available to enforce the rules and the sanctions that can 
be used if there is non-compliance with the rules. 
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3 6 2 Parties enforcing the rules 
The rules governing the sectional title scheme are enforced by the trustees, a 
democratically elected group, representing the body corporate, with whom they are 
in a fiduciary relationship.363 The trustees are responsible for the management, 
control and administration of the sectional title scheme.364 They are bound to the 
rules and therefore they have no free or unlimited discretion with regard to the 
exercise of the management function unless the rules make provision for it.365 They 
are obliged to take action when they become aware of any breaches of the rules, 
either by personal observation or when a complaint is lodged by a resident. Should 
they fail to act an aggrieved owner can initiate proceedings on behalf of the body 
corporate.366 The trustees are empowered367 to do all things reasonably necessary 
to enforce the rules of the body corporate.368  
 
3 6 3 Mechanisms to enforce rules and sanctions for non-compliance 
3 6 3 1 Introduction 
The South African sectional title legislation was to a large extent based on the 
Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act,369 which did not include any rule enforcement or 
dispute settling mechanism. The deficiency in the legislation was recognised and 
second generation legislation370 was drafted, which amended the shortcoming. 
Neither the Sectional Titles Act nor the management or conduct rules contain 
effective sanctions to be enforced against sectional owners who fail to fulfil their 
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obligations. However, it is important that the rules should be enforceable through 
effective sanctions in the event of non-compliance.  
 
Effective sanctions are important as buyers rely on the proper and stable 
administration of the scheme for the realisation of their anticipated lifestyle. The rules 
will only be effective if there is a “workable system”371 of enforcement mechanisms; 
otherwise, it will be necessary to obtain a court order to enforce compliance. The 
existing enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for non-compliance are those for 
financial obligations and non-financial obligations, which will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
 
3 6 3 2 Enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for financial 
obligations 
When an owner is in default with his levy contributions, the trustees of the body 
corporate are required to take some form of effective action against him. The 
trustees cannot evict the recalcitrant owner as he is the owner of the unit.372 
However, there are a number of sanctions that can be enforced in the case of non 
compliance, although the effectiveness of some is limited.  
 
The trustees of the body corporate can institute legal proceedings against the owner 
for any outstanding levy contributions,373 all the legal costs incurred in recovering the 
arrear levies374 and accrued interest on such amount.375 As the body corporate is a 
juristic person, it cannot recover these amounts in the Small Claims Court, which 
would have involved a cheaper procedure.  
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The voting right at a general meeting can be taken away if a sectional owner is in 
default with his levy contributions.376 However, this deprivation is only applicable if 
there is an ordinary resolution and not if the owner has to vote regarding a special or 
unanimous resolution which affects the future of all sectional owners in the scheme.  
 
The Registrar may not register a transfer of a unit unless a conveyancer’s certificate 
is produced confirming that at the date of registration, the body corporate has 
certified that all monies due to it have been paid or that provision has been made for 
payment in the near future.377 This is an embargo provision placed on the alienation 
of a unit if there are outstanding levies.378 However, this sanction is only effective if 
the unit is not mortgaged.  
 
The body corporate can attach the moveable assets belonging to the owner and sell 
them in execution to cover the defaulting payments.379 If there are no movable 
assets or an insufficient amount has been obtained, the trustees can attach the unit 
and have it sold in execution.380 Mortgage bond holders are also sometimes involved 
and it is questionable whether their rights may rank higher than those of the body 
corporate. However, the body corporate is granted a perfect claim to the proceeds of 
the sale and is therefore ranked higher than mortgagees.381 
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The Magistrates’ Courts Act382 also makes provision for sanctions, emoluments 
attachment orders,383 garnishee orders384 and administration orders.385 The body 
corporate could attach the rent386 owing by a lessee to the defaulting owner of the 
unit or it may institute sequestration proceedings against the owner.387 However, this 
too runs the risk of incurring high costs. 
 
3 6 3 3 Enforcement mechanisms and sanctions for non-financial 
obligations 
The voting right at a general meeting can be taken away if a sectional owner 
persistently breaches the conduct rules as set out in Annexure 9.388 However, this 
deprivation is only applicable if there is an ordinary resolution and not if the owner 
has to vote regarding a special or unanimous resolution which affects the future of all 
sectional owners in the scheme. Therefore, this is not an effective enforcement 
mechanism as its applicability is conditional on the type of resolution taking place. 
 
An owner who fails to maintain and repair his section may be given written notice to 
maintain or repair it.389 If the owner fails to comply, the body corporate can affect the 
necessary maintenance and repairs and recover the reasonable cost from the 
owner.390 In the case of a vehicle being parked on the common property without the 
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written consent of the trustees, the body corporate may have it removed at the risk 
and expense of the owner.391 
 
A statutory obligation or rule can only be enforced by way of a court order for specific 
performance, an action for damages, an interdict392 or for the payment of legal 
costs.393 Choosing the path of litigation394 is an expensive and time-consuming 
enforcement mechanism and will not necessarily lead to a harmonious community 
but could rather permanently disturb the harmony of the sectional title community. A 
balance must be reached between the right of the owner to be protected, weighed 
against the preservation of the harmonious relationships in the scheme. 
 
In order to prevent such drastic measures, a general resolution should be passed by 
the body corporate to empower the trustees to impose fines or a penalty system in 
the case of contraventions, to establish a domestic tribunal to deal with these 
matters, or to require security from an owner to ensure that he will refrain from 
vexatious actions in the future.395 In this case, a fair investigation is required. 
Domestic tribunals were introduced under the first generation 1971 legislation396 and 
removed in terms of the second generation 1986 legislation397 because the power to 
punish was in the hands of lay people, which made it open to abuse. This 
“disciplinary committee”398 dealt with penalties linked to offences with the use of fines 
and sanctions. According to the saying “fines do not good neighbours make,”399 it 
can be seen that the imposition of fines as penalties is an imperfect enforcement 
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mechanism as trustees do not have and should not be given the authority to impose 
fines as this could result in an abuse of power. 
 
Complaints by residents in connection with a breach of rules by fellow residents must 
be submitted in writing to the trustees, in confidence and supported by the signature 
of a reliable witness. The first warning issued by the trustee is a “friendly 
reminder”.400 However, if the offending party refuses to cooperate and blatantly 
ignores the trustees’ pleas, a fine is imposed. In order to ensure that the imposition 
of a fine is justified and that the resident is not being victimised, each breach of the 
rules should be carefully documented in the “breach of rules” register.401 At times, 
the rules are not adhered to because of ignorance on the part of the owners, 
although “ignorance of the law is not a defence”.402 The trustees should put into 
place a positive “rules awareness” programme to keep residents informed and 
updated on the rules in operation.403   
 
3 6 4 Comparative perspective of enforcement mechanisms and 
sanctions for non-compliance 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a comparative survey will be used, 
where relevant, of jurisdictions which have similar approaches to the issues 
surrounding sectional title schemes. In this instance, Germany provides a good 
illustration of how effective enforcement mechanisms could look. Although the 
German sanctions are absolute and effective in their application, it has been 
questioned whether similar sanctions with such “sharp teeth” would be possible in 
the South African context.404 Before implementing any exclusionary sanctions in 
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South Africa, such as those found in Germany, caution must be exercised to not limit 
ownership to a great extent and not to destroy the reputation of the scheme. 
 
An example of a German sanction, as provided for in the 
Wohnungseigentumsgesetz,405 empowers an application to be made to court by the 
body corporate, for an order forcing an owner who committed such a serious breach 
of his obligations that it cannot be expected from the other residents to continue 
living in the same community, to dispose of his unit. If the owner fails to comply with 
the court order, the manager is empowered to sell the unit by public auction at the 
fair market value and give the proceeds of the sale to the defaulting owner.406 The 
purpose of such an absolute sanction is to ensure a harmonious community and 
even though its application is rare, it serves as an effective deterrent.407  
 
A lesser sanction by which an apartment owner’s financial obligations can be 
enforced, which is similar to that of South Africa, is that an owner’s right to vote may 
be withdrawn in the case of non-compliance with an obligation. The owner may then 
challenge the sanction before a special court which will decide whether the sanction 
is appropriate and reasonable.408 
 
3 7 Disputes 
3 7 1 Introduction 
In any social environment, disputes are inevitable. In such a close-knit and dense 
community as a sectional title scheme, disputes sometimes have serious 
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consequences for the body corporate. A situation where different people, mostly 
strangers, live together in a close community and share common amenities, is bound 
to lead to disagreements, hence the saying “co-ownership is the mother of all 
disputes.”409 Here reference will be made to the causes of disputes, the parties 
involved in a dispute and the options available for resolving disputes. The parties 
involved can choose to make use of one or more of the following methods in order to 
resolve a situation of conflict based on the method most suited to the dispute or the 
one which offers the most advantages or the least disadvantages. These 
mechanisms could also be reverted to as a matter of course; negotiation, mediation, 
arbitration, litigation, domestic tribunals, the instituting of fines and sectional title 
courts.  
 
There are many causes of disputes that need to be effectively resolved before the 
community can function as a harmonious entity. A few examples will be discussed, 
namely differences of opinion between the owners inter se and between the trustees 
and the owners,410 enforcement mechanisms, non-compliance with the rules,411 lack 
of substantive and procedural restraints on rule-making,412 unfair and unreasonable 
restrictions limiting the owners’ use and enjoyment of their sections and referred to 
as “Hitler-like commands”413 and misconduct on the part of owners and residents. 
 
A dispute can either arise between unit owners or residents inter se, known as 
“opposing owner factions”414 or between owners or residents and the trustees or the 
managing agent. Disputes can even arise between trustees, a situation known as 
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“opposing trustees”.415 The trustees act as the representatives of the body corporate 
and as such should consider the best interests of the owners and residents, and not 
enrich them at the expense of the body corporate.416 
 
3 7 2 Options for resolving disputes 
If the managing agent and the trustees believe that they have neither the necessary 
skill nor the ability to resolve a dispute, the Sectional Titles Act provides for the 
appointment of three types of professionals to assist the body corporate, namely a 
curator ad litem,417 an administrator418 and an arbitrator.419 Trustees, if they are 
owners in the scheme and managing agents often lack the required mediation skills 
needed in order to resolve disputes and their impartiality often comes into question 
due to conflict of interests or inconsistency with regard to the application of the 
rules.420 
 
Negotiation is the least formal method of dispute resolution. The parties negotiate 
directly with one another in order to resolve the dispute at hand by coming to an 
agreement that attempts to satisfy everyone’s needs. However, this is normally only 
the first step in a very time consuming process of dispute resolution. 
  
Mediation is a popular method of dispute resolution as it ensures a harmonious 
community after the mediation process by preserving the relationships of all those 
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involved in the process.421 An impartial and trained mediator helps the parties 
involved reach a settlement. However, mediators do not have any decision-making 
power. 
 
Before the 1997 amendments, neither the Sectional Titles Act nor the regulations 
made provision for dispute resolution. Under the Act, the Arbitration Act422 was 
referred to regarding matters of dispute that required resolution. Since the 
amendments, the standard management rules423 make provision for the resolution of 
disputes by way of arbitration. If a real difference of opinion arises between the body 
corporate and an owner or between the owners, the dispute can be referred to 
arbitration. An arbitrator is an impartial third party, a decision-maker appointed by 
contract, statute or chosen by the parties involved. An arbitrator should be appointed 
to resolve such dispute unless the relief sought cannot be granted in arbitration 
proceedings.424 The arbitration procedure is more expedient and less expensive than 
court proceedings. The decision of the arbitrator, known as an award, is final and 
binding. It may be enforced by being made an order of the high court upon 
application.425 Statutory arbitration is currently the only method sanctioned for 
dispute resolution as the regulations make it compulsory.426  
 
The body corporate can approach a high court for an interdict.427 However, due to 
the complexity of the relationships involved in sectional title disputes, resolving 
disputes with this traditional method is a formal, time-consuming and expensive 
                                            
421
 Paddock GJ “Options for resolving sectional title disputes” (January 2009) 
http://www.sto.co.za/images/200904%20Options%20%For%20Resolution%20of%20Sectional%20Titl
e%20Disputes.pdf (accessed online on 01/09/2010). 
422
 42 of 1965. 
423
 Annex 8 rule 71 of the Sectional Titles Act. See Van der Merwe CG “Sectional title courts as an 
alternative to arbitration for the settlement of disputes in a sectional title scheme” (1999) 116 SALJ 
624-641 at 624 and Butler D “The arbitration of disputes in sectional title schemes under management 
rule 71” (1998) 9 Stell LR 256-279 at 257. 
424
 Body Corporate of Greenacres v Greenacres Unit 17 CC 2008 (3) SA 167 (SCA). 
425
 Body Corporate of the Tuzla Mews Scheme v Yang [2001] 3 All SA 427 (W) and Vidavsky v Body 
Corporate of Sunhill Villas 2005 (5) SA 200 (SCA). 
426
 Van der Merwe CG “Sectional titles courts as an alternative for the settlement of disputes in a 
sectional title scheme” (1999) 116 SALJ 624-641 at 624-625. 
427
 Annex 8 rule 71 (7). See also Body Corporate Montpark Drakens v Smuts (22380/05) [2006] 
ZAGPHC 38 (26 April 2006). 

 
process,428 leading to a situation not suited for maintaining social harmony. Such 
judicial intervention is not suited to matters of a trivial nature. Therefore litigation is 
seen as being an inappropriate forum for dispute resolution in sectional title 
schemes.429  
 
3 7 3 Proposed methods of dispute resolution 
An all-encompassing method of dispute resolution is needed for resolving sectional 
title disputes. A mechanism adopted by Australia, similar to sectional title courts, 
seems to be preferable to the arbitration procedure sanctioned by the Sectional 
Titles Amendment Act in South Africa, due to the low costs involved, accessibility, 
simplicity, speed, certainty, enforcement, publicity or confidentiality and its binding 
nature.430 Another method that could be adopted to resolve disputes is that of 
Germany, which makes provision for an informal and voluntary procedure regulating 
the settlement of disputes without the need for legal representation. The sectional 
owner approaches the district magistrate who then sets out to settle the dispute at 
hand.431  
 
The Minister of Human Settlements published the Community Scheme Ombud 
Service Bill432 in 2009 for public comment. The purpose of the Bill is to provide for 
the establishment of the Community Scheme Ombud Service, a juristic person, and 
to provide for its functions and powers.433 Amongst others, its functions are to 
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develop and provide a dispute resolution service.434 This Bill has been amended by 
the Community Scheme Ombud Service Bill of 2010.435  
 
The Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs recognised that amendments to the 
Sectional Titles Act were needed in order to improve dispute resolution mechanisms 
and other management issues. A task team was appointed to investigate these 
matters and on 30 October 2009, the Sectional Title Schemes Management Bill was 
published.436 The Bill removes the rules relating to sectional title scheme 
management and administration from the Sectional Titles Act to ensure that all 
provisions relating to management is contained in the Bill. Apart from the introduction 
of a Sectional Title Ombudsman, the Bill did not introduce any alternatives to the 
dispute resolution mechanisms found in the Act. This Bill has been amended by the 
Sectional Title Schemes Management Bill 20 of 2010.437  
 
3 8 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, a statutory analysis and comparative survey have been used to 
describe the rules governing a sectional title scheme. The sources and the types of 
rules were examined, as well as their legal nature, the limitations that they impose, 
the amendment procedure, the operation and scope of application of the rules, the 
enforcement mechanisms available, the sanctions for non-compliance, disputes and 
the various methods of dispute resolution that can be used. At this stage, a 
conclusion can be reached that if rules were not introduced and enforced in sectional 
title schemes, the community of sectional owners and other occupiers would not be 
able to co-exist as harmonious members of the body corporate. The trustees would 
not be able to control and administer the scheme which would lead to financial 
instability and the eventual failure and winding-up of the scheme. 
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As put forward in the hypothesis, the rules restrict the rights and the entitlements of 
the owners and occupiers of the sections, and there is a limitation of ownership in 
the enforcement of the rules and the obligations imposed. In some instances the 
rules might exceed the bounds of reasonableness and result in unfair discrimination, 
arbitrary deprivation, unfair administrative action and restrictions on access to courts 
for dispute resolution. The discussion in this chapter served to identify the types of 
rules that may exceed the bounds of reasonableness, therefore making it necessary, 
in the next chapter, to evaluate the rules in light of the Constitution in order to ensure 
that rules which are contrary to the fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Constitution, are declared invalid and unenforceable.  
  

 
4 Comparative discussion on the constitutionality 
of the rules  
4 1 Introduction 
Purchasers of units in sectional title schemes automatically become members of the 
body corporate438 at registration of the units in their names.439  They are then 
bound440 by the statutorily prescribed model management441 and conduct442 rules, as 
well as the rules substituted, added to, amended or repealed by the developer443 
initially or later by the body corporate.444 Prospective buyers and new sectional 
owners are often unaware of the existence of the rules, or if they know of the rules, 
they are unaware of its contents. These various types of rules are seen as the 
objective, internal law of a private law institution,445 such as the community of owners 
as a body corporate and are not contractual in nature.446  The statutorily prescribed 
model rules are law of general application.447 However, the rules amended, added 
to, substituted and repealed by the developers initially and later by the trustees of the 
                                            
438
 See s 36(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, which provides that the body corporate of a 
sectional title scheme is deemed established when a person, other than the developer, becomes an 
owner of a unit. See further s 39(1) which provides that this communal association of sectional 
owners is represented by democratically elected trustees. 
439
 J de Moor (Edms) Bpk v Beheerliggaam van Outeniqua 1985 (3) SA 997 (T) 1002-1003. See 
further Van der Merwe CG “Die reëls van die deeleiendomgemeenskap ingevolge die Wet op 
Deeltitels” 1981 TSAR 251-271 at 267-270. 
440
 Pienaar GJ “Die regsaard van privaatregtelike reëls en regulasies” (1991) 54 THRHR 400-413 at 
405-406. 
441
 Management rules are governed by s 35(2)(a) and are found in Annex 8 of the Sectional Titles Act. 
442
 Conduct rules are governed by s 35(2)(b) and are found in Annex 9 of the Sectional Titles Act. 
443
 Ss 11(3)(e) and 35(2)(a) and (b). 
444
 S 35(2)(a) and (b). 
445
 Wiljay Investments (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate Bryanston Crescent 1984 (2) SA 722 (T) 727D. See 
further Lottering v Palm 2008 (2) SA 553 (D) at 557A-C, which confirmed the court’s decision in  
Wiljay Investments (Pty) Ltd v Body Corporate Bryanston Crescent, namely that the rules governing 
sectional title schemes constitute the terms of an agreement between the members of the body 
corporate and the trustees. However, despite the authority of these two decisions, it is more accurate 
to describe the legal nature of the rules by referring to the fact that they were created by the owners 
as the objective law of an autonomous private law community. Therefore, the rules can be classified 
as the internal law of the community of owners as a body corporate. Refer to chapter 3 for a 
discussion on the legal nature of the rules under the heading 3 3. 
446
 See Pienaar GJ “Die regsaard van privaatregtelike reëls en regulasies” (1991) 54 THRHR 400-413 
at 400; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
(5th ed 2006) 464; Horwitz A The function and operation of the community of sectional owners: its 
successes and failures (1985) 124-125 and Wood-Bodley MC “‘House rules’ in sectional title schemes 
– are they ultra vires?” (2003) 120 SALJ 602-609 at 603. 
447
 See the discussion on law of general application under the heading 4 2 4 1. 

 
body corporate are not prescribed by legislation but are rather the internal objective 
law of a private law institution.448  
 
The body corporate is a juristic person, but the sectional owners, as members of the 
body corporate, are held personally liable for the debts of the sectional title 
community in proportion to their participation quotas.449 The rules provide for the 
control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of the sections and the 
common property.450 In some sectional title schemes, these use rights are regulated 
to such an extent by rigid and inflexible rules that the sectional owners’ exercise of 
their property rights is restricted. However, the trustees, who are in a fiduciary 
relationship to the members of the body corporate, may not act ultra vires or outside 
their scope of authority. Therefore, they may not impose excessive rules as part of 
their executive function.  
 
Other than the model management and conduct rules prescribed by the Sectional 
Titles Act, non-prescribed rules also limit sectional owners’ property rights. These 
additional rules are the house rules, the rules amended, added to or substituted by 
the developer451 before the establishment of the body corporate and the rules 
repealed, amended, added to or substituted by the body corporate452 through either 
unanimous453 or special resolution.454 
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There are two constitutional issues that will be discussed in this chapter. The 
question of constitutional validity arises firstly, when one considers whether private 
institutions, such as the body corporate, may restrict property rights and secondly, 
when one looks at the extent to which restrictions are considered to be 
constitutionally permissible. In terms of the first issue, section 8 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa 1996, provides for the horizontal application455 of the 
Constitution. Section 8(1) of the Constitution states that “the Bill of Rights applies to 
all law” and section 8(2) provides that “a provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural 
or juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.” In terms of the 
property clause, section 25 of the Constitution, horizontal application is debatable.456  
 
When the body corporate infringes a sectional owner or other occupier’s rights and 
the owner or the occupier, as a private person, relies directly on a provision in the 
Constitution to found a cause of action for a constitutional attack on the body 
corporate, as a private person, in a private dispute, 457 direct horizontal application458 
occurs. One question investigated in this chapter is whether such horizontal 
application is feasible. The statutorily prescribed model rules are law of general 
application459 and as such are a vertical application of the state’s legislative power as 
they are imposed by the state or an organ of state acting under the state’s authority. 
However, the rules amended, added to, substituted and repealed by the developers 
initially and later by the trustees of the body corporate are not prescribed by 
legislation but are rather the internal objective law of a private law institution460 and 
as such are a horizontal application between the body corporate as a private 
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institution and the sectional owners and other occupiers when they restrict the 
property rights of these parties.  
 
In terms of the second issue, it will be determined whether the statutory restrictions 
brought about by the rules are unconstitutional deprivations of property rights in 
terms of section 25 of the Constitution, which states that “no one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property.” It will be determined whether the restrictive rules’ 
application amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property, which would be  
unenforceable due to its constitutional invalidity and whether the deprivation can be 
justified in terms of the limitation clause.461 Section 39(2) of the Constitution states 
that “when interpreting any legislation ... every court, tribunal or forum must promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” This constitutional mandate 
necessitates a section 25(1) constitutional validity inquiry with regard to legislation 
that might limit constitutional rights. A limitation of a constitutional right is essentially 
a “justifiable infringement”,462 which is not unconstitutional if it occurs for a reason 
that is accepted as a justification for infringing the rights in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The decision of First National 
Bank of South Africa Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services463 (hereinafter referred to as FNB) provides a useful test when 
interpreting section 25(1)464 and it will be extensively referred to in this discussion.  
 
Rules, serving as “regulatory controls”, restrict sectional owners’ free use, 
enjoyment, exploitation and disposal of property, thereby “diminishing its value or 
profitability.”465 These restrictive rules will be tested against certain non-property 
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights,466 in order to determine if they constitute 
constitutional limitations. The following specific constitutionally entrenched rights will 
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be looked at more closely: equality,467 specifically unfair discrimination;468 just 
administrative action;469 and access to courts.470 From this perspective, reference 
will be made to case law from a comparative jurisdiction, namely the United States of 
America. This jurisdiction has been chosen because of the wide range of 
constitutional cases where the right of equality has come into question and has been 
dealt with. 
 
4 2  Section 25(1) of the Constitution and FNB as an interpretative 
tool 
4 2 1 Introduction 
In the FNB decision, Ackermann J developed a test for the property challenge471 by 
dividing the property clause enquiry into several stages, formulated as a set of 
questions. In terms of this methodology, it must be determined whether the law 
complained of affects property in terms of section 25(1). If it does, it must be asked 
whether it amounts to a deprivation of property by law.472 If this question is answered 
in the affirmative, it must be determined whether the deprivation is consistent with 
section 25(1) and if it is not, it must be determined whether the deprivation can be 
justified under section 36(1) of the Constitution.473 According to the Court, if a 
deprivation is arbitrary and not justifiable, “that is the end of the matter. The provision 
is unconstitutional.”474 The test then need not continue to the expropriation stage. 
However, if the deprivation infringes section 25(1) but is a justified limitation, the 
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question arises whether it is an expropriation. If so, the deprivation must comply with 
the requirements of section 25(2)(a), be for a public purpose or in the public interest 
and section 25(2)(b), be subject to compensation.475 
 
4 2 2  Interest in property 
In order to determine whether there is an interest in property, it needs to be 
determined what the term ‘property’ encompasses. A sectional title unit is not 
traditional immovable property. The FNB case confirmed that land and movable 
corporeals are property for the purposes of protection in terms of the property 
clause. The Court also found that there is no indication that property for the purposes 
of the property clause is restricted to corporeal property.476 For the purposes of this 
discussion, property is the “objects of rights and the rights themselves.”477  
 
The Court in FNB, as a preliminary inquiry, considers whether the right or entitlement 
affected by the deprivation, constitutes an interest in property. It must, in the case of 
sectional titles, be determined whether the right or entitlement, namely ownership of 
a unit and the use and enjoyment of a section and share in the common property,478  
constitutes a property interest within the Court’s interpretation of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.479 The entitlement of use and enjoyment does not only extend to 
sectional owners but also to other occupiers in a scheme, such as tenants because 
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the rules affect all parties residing in a scheme irrespective of ownership. The 
sectional owners’ property interests are stronger than those of other occupiers, and 
therefore require stronger justification for any limitations. 
 
4 2 3 Deprivation 
The second stage in the constitutional inquiry as set out in the FNB decision, is 
whether there has been a deprivation of the property. In the FNB decision, 
Ackermann J defines a deprivation by saying that “any interference with the use, 
enjoyment or exploitation of private property involves some deprivation in respect of 
the person having title or right to or in the property concerned.” 480  Therefore, 
deprivation is not limited to the taking away of property but includes the regulation of 
property, such as the restrictions imposed by sectional title rules, which limit the 
owner’s right of use and enjoyment. In determining whether or not there has been a 
deprivation, the extent to which the use and enjoyment of property has been 
interfered with should be determined.481  
 
The deprivation provision, section 25(1) of the property clause in the Constitution, is 
phrased negatively and does not include a positive guarantee of property.482 It 
merely protects private rights against improper state interference by way of state 
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regulation of the use of property.  However, this protection is not absolute. Certain 
limitations on the use of common property, as regulatory measures enforced by 
legislation, may result in a constitutionally legitimate and valid deprivation or 
regulation of property rights. Section 25(1) provides that deprivations will be 
constitutionally valid if they are introduced by law of general application and if they 
do not permit an arbitrary deprivation of property. A regulatory measure is arbitrary 
when the legislation does not provide sufficient reason for the particular regulation or 
if it is procedurally unfair.483 Limitations on the property or property rights of sectional 
owners in sectional title communities will normally fall within this category of 
regulations which are constitutionally permissible, because such limitations are laid 
down by generally applicable legislation. Therefore, for practical purposes, the main 
requirement would be that they are not arbitrary.484  
 
Non-prescribed rules, such as those substituted, added to, amended or repealed by 
either the developer485 initially or later by the body corporate486 by resolution,487 are 
also valid as the Act authorises the developer and the body corporate to ensure that 
the rules operative suit the needs of the sectional title scheme. In terms of house 
rules, the trustees are empowered to do all things reasonably necessary for the 
control, management and administration of the common property. Therefore, by 
adopting house rules, they are exercising their statutory powers. House rules are 
enforceable when they comply with two requirements of legitimacy. They must be an 
exercise of the trustees’ powers of control over the common property or permission 
given by the trustees exercising their discretion.488 However, they may not be 
objectionable in the way that they restrict the rights of sectional owners.489 
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Besides the individual function of securing the property rights of individual sectional 
owners, constitutional validity of property also has a social function.490 This function 
dictates that property rights may be restricted by statutorily prescribed and other 
limitations in the interest of the community of sectional owners. The rules of sectional 
title communities are of such a nature that the property rights of members of these 
communities are restricted in the interest of the property community, and are 
therefore constitutionally permissible regulations. However, if these restrictions are 
unreasonable in their application and are found to be in conflict with the fundamental 
non-property rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights, they will be constitutionally 
invalid and impermissible.491   
 
The function of the deprivation provision is “to ensure that the property clause does 
not render property absolute or inviolate, and to establish the constitutional principle 
that at least some (mostly state) interferences with and limitations of (the use of) 
property are inevitable and necessary (in the public interest) and, therefore, 
legitimate”492 and “to ensure that the inevitable and necessary limitations of property 
are not imposed arbitrarily and unfairly, but in line with the constitutional guarantee of 
due process.”493 Therefore, the deprivation provision assumes that property (and the 
property guarantee) may be limited and lays down the requirements for limitations to 
be valid and legitimate. Section 25(1) is interpreted and applied in terms of a balance 
between the protection of individual rights and the promotion or protection of the 
social or public responsibilities or duties.494 
 
For the purposes of this discussion, attention will now be turned specifically to 
deprivations in sectional title schemes. The Sectional Titles Act deprives sectional 
                                            
490
 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5th ed 
2006) 579. 
491
 A sectional title scheme will never be able to exclude a certain race, religion, gender, age etc 
merely to serve a social function of upholding the rights of the community of sectional owners and 
other occupiers as these restrictions will be in direct conflict with constitutional rights.  
492
 See Van der Walt AJ The constitutional property clause: a comparative analysis of section 25 of 
the South African Constitution, 1996 (1997) 18 and Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 
(2005) 137. 
493
 See Van der Walt AJ The constitutional property clause: a comparative analysis of section 25 of 
the South African Constitution, 1996 (1999) 18 and Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 
(2005) 137. 
494
 See Van der Walt AJ The constitutional property clause: a comparative analysis of section 25 of 
the South African Constitution, 1996 (1999) 19. 


 
owners and other occupiers of their property rights by regulating their entitlements of 
use and enjoyment of their sections and their share in the common property. These 
rights are limited by the rules prescribed by the Act and those non-prescribed rules, 
such as the house rules adopted by the trustees and the rules added to, amended, 
substituted, repealed and adopted by either the developer initially or by the body 
corporate by the appropriate resolution.  
 
The first example of a set of statutorily prescribed rules which deprive an owner or 
occupier of their entitlements of use and enjoyment is section 44 of the Sectional 
Titles Act, which sets out the duties of the owners and occupiers of sections. These 
obligations interfere with the sectional owners’ and occupiers’ entitlements of use 
and enjoyment. For example, section 44(1)(d) states that an owner shall “use and 
enjoy the common property in such a manner as not unreasonably to interfere with 
the use and enjoyment thereof by other owners or other persons lawfully on the 
premises.” This rule requires sectional owners and occupiers to behave in a way that 
will not disturb the use and enjoyment of the sections and common property by other 
sectional owners, occupiers and other persons lawfully on the premises.495 
Compliance with this rule ensures that all the residents living in a scheme will form a 
harmonious community, with the least cause for conflict and disputes. Therefore, this 
rule serves a legitimate aim and will be reasonable in so far as it is applied equally to 
all residents in the scheme. 
 
Another example is the statutorily prescribed rule in section 44(1)(e) of the Sectional 
Titles Act, which states that an owner shall “not use his section or exclusive use 
area, or permit it to be used, in such a manner or for such a purpose as shall cause 
a nuisance to any occupier of a section.” This rule prohibits any behaviour or activity 
that may reasonably be perceived as causing a nuisance to other sectional owners 
and occupiers. Noise, for example, can “destroy the harmonious fabric of a sectional 
title scheme.”496 Therefore, the creation of any noise likely to interfere with the 
peaceful enjoyment of another unit by its owner, occupier or by any person using the 
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common property, may possibly be prohibited by a special rule. Therefore, this rule 
can be seen as being a legitimate limitation of the sectional owners’ and other 
occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment because compliance with the rule will 
ensure that causes for disputes do not arise. 
 
As mentioned before, sectional owners and occupiers may not use their sections in a 
manner that will cause unreasonable nuisance to other residents in the scheme, 
thereby prejudicing their use and enjoyment of their sections to a degree that 
exceeds what the other residents can reasonably be expected to tolerate. However, 
what can be expected to be tolerated is the normal and lawful use of a section. 
Because the problem of noise and nuisance is subjective and can easily be resolved 
through the exercise of co-operation, it is incumbent on every owner to be sensitive 
to the needs of their neighbours. However, if the problem persists, the matter will be 
referred to arbitration or mediation in terms of the prescribed management rule.497  
 
The duty rests on prospective buyers to be aware of the potential for noise within a 
scheme. Some types of noise are not easily controlled. Therefore, the sections that 
are close to the source of the noise will depreciate in value. When making the 
decision as to whether an act constitutes a nuisance, the trustees of the body 
corporate must take all the relevant circumstances into consideration before 
concluding that the owner or occupier of a unit has contravened a rule.498 
 
One group of limitations brought about by the rules concern the appearance of the 
sections and the scheme.499 The model management rules found in Annexure 8 of 
the Sectional Titles Act should be read with section 35(1)(a) of the Act. Management 
rule 68(1)(i) provides that an owner “shall not use his section, exclusive use area or 
any part of the common property, or permit it to be used, in such a manner or for 
such purpose as shall be injurious to the reputation of the building.” Management 
rule 68(1)(iv)500 provides that an owner “shall not do anything to his section or 
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exclusive use area which is likely to prejudice the harmonious appearance of the 
building.”  
 
One of the main and most attractive features of a sectional title scheme is its 
harmonious appearance. Prospective buyers are interested in purchasing a unit in a 
scheme where all the sections are similar in appearance, neat and well maintained. 
Purchasers want to be assured that their section and share in the common property 
will increase in value and will attract similar interest.  A restriction in the United 
States of America which is similar to the harmonious appearance rule501 in the South 
African Sectional Titles Act, is the uniform architectural standards restriction. In 
common interest developments in the USA, the rules dictate uniform architectural 
standards such as the colour of individual homes,502 the style of windows,503 the type 
of lighting504 and fencing505 permissible, where cars are allowed to be parked and 
what type of car is allowed to be parked on the premises.506  
 
Another set of limitations brought about by the rules concern the body corporate’s 
powers to enforce payment of the owner’s debts by execution against the section.507 
In exchange for the entitlement of use and enjoyment of sections and the common 
property, residents must pay levies. When a sectional owner is in default with his 
levy contributions, the trustees of the body corporate are required to take some form 
of effective action against him. The trustees cannot evict the recalcitrant sectional 
owner as he is the owner of the unit.508  
 
                                            
501
 Annex 8 rule 68(1)(iv). 
502
 West Hill Colony Inc v Sauerwein 138 NE 2d 403 (Ohio Ct App 1956). 
503
 Sterling Village Condominium Inc v Breitenbach 251 So 2d 685 (Fla 4th DCA 1971). 
504
 Delaporte v Preston Square Inc 680 SW 2d 561 (Tex Ct App 1984). 
505
 Heritage Heights Home-owners Association v Esser 565 P 2d 207 (Ariz Ct App 1977). 
506
 See Van der Merwe CG, Mohr P and Blumberg M “The Bill of Rights and the rules of sectional title 
schemes: a comparative perspective” (2000) 11 Stell LR 155-181 at 156-157. See further Holleman v 
Mission Trace Home-owners Association 556 SW 2d 632 (Tex Civ App 1977); Bernado Villas 
Management Corp Number Two v Black 235 Cal Rptr 509 (Ct App 1987) and Unit Owners 
Association of Build America 1 v Gillman 292 SE 2d 378 (Va 1982). 
507
 Refer to the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 6 3 2. 
508
 See Body Corporate of the Shaftesbury Sectional Title Scheme v Estate of the late Wilhelm 
Rippert [2003] 2 All SA 233 (C). See further s 26(3) of the Constitution and the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 

 
There are a number of sanctions that can be enforced in the case of non compliance 
with financial obligations. However, the effectiveness of some sanctions is limited. 
These sanctions serve an important function because they ensure financial stability 
and security in a sectional title scheme. The continued existence of a scheme is 
dependent on the sectional owners’ fulfilling their financial obligations. Potential 
purchasers will not buy a unit in a scheme that cannot be effectively controlled and 
managed as it will negatively affect their investment and entitlements of ownership. 
An example of an arguably ineffective sanction is when the voting right at a general 
meeting is taken away when a sectional owner is in default with his levy 
contributions.509 This deprivation is only applicable if there is an ordinary resolution 
and not if the owner has to vote regarding a special or unanimous resolution which 
affects the future of all sectional owners in the scheme.  
 
The Registrar may not register a transfer of a unit unless a conveyancer’s certificate 
is produced confirming that at the date of registration, the body corporate has 
certified that all monies due to it have been paid or that provision has been made for 
payment in the near future.510 This is an embargo provision placed on the alienation 
of a unit if there are outstanding levies. However, this sanction is only effective if the 
unit is not mortgaged.511 The body corporate can attach the moveable assets 
belonging to the owner and sell them in execution to cover the defaulting 
payments.512 If there are no moveable assets or an insufficient amount has been 
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obtained, the trustees can attach the unit and have it sold in execution.513 Mortgage 
bond holders are also sometimes involved and it is questionable whether their rights 
may rank higher than those of the body corporate. However, the body corporate is 
granted a perfect claim to the proceeds of the sale and is therefore ranked higher 
than mortgagees.514  
 
The Magistrates’ Courts Act515 also makes provision for the following sanctions: 
emoluments attachment orders,516 garnishee orders517 and administration orders.518 
The body corporate could attach the rent519 owing by a lessee to the defaulting 
owner of the unit or it may institute sequestration proceedings against the owner.520 
However, this too runs the risk of incurring high costs.521 
 
The model conduct rules in Annexure 9 of the Sectional Titles Act, which are to be 
read with section 35(2)(b) of the Act, further limit the sectional owner or occupier’s 
entitlement of use and enjoyment. Conduct rule 1(1) states that “an owner or 
occupier shall not, without the consent in writing of the trustees, which approval may 
not be unreasonably withheld, keep any animal, reptile or bird in a section or on the 
common property.”522 Conduct rule 3 prohibits any sectional owner or occupier from 
                                                                                                                                       
Bank v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa [2004] 1 All SA 259 (SCA). Refer to the discussion in chapter 3 
under the heading 3 6 3 2. 
513
 Segal N “Any cure for the body corporate blues?” (2004) 121 SALJ 552-555 at 553. Refer to the 
discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 6 3 2. 
514
 See s 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa). See further Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building [1995] 1 All 
SA 87 (C) and 1996 (1) SA 131 (A); South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of the 
Court, Pretoria 1996 (1) SA 401 (T); Body Corporate of the Geovy Villa v Sheriff, Pretoria Central 
Magistrate’s Court 2003 (1) SA 69 (T) and FirstRand Bank v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa [2004] 1 
All SA 259 (SCA). See further Van der Merwe CG “Sanctions in terms of the South African Sectional 
Titles Act and the German Wohnungseigentumsgesetz: should the South African statute be given 
equally sharp teeth?” (1993) 26 CILSA 85-97 at 88. 
515
 32 of 1944. 
516
 S 65J. 
517
 S 72. 
518
 S 74-74W. 
519
 S 68. 
520
 See s 8 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. See further Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways 
Building [1995] 1 All SA 87 (C) and 1996 (1) SA 131 (A) and Barnard NO v Regspersoon van Aminie 
[2001] 3 All SA 433 (A). 
521
 Refer to the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 6 3 2. 
522
 Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme v Dorse 1999 (2) SA 512 (D). See further the 
discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 3. 

 
parking or leaving their vehicles anywhere on the common property.523 Conduct rule 
4 prohibits any alterations to the common property.524 Conduct rule 5 prohibits any 
conduct that would lead to an aesthetically displeasing or undesirable effect when 
view from the outside of the scheme.525 These statutorily prescribed deprivations will 
now be tested in terms of their constitutional validity. 
 
4 2 4  Compliance with the requirements of section 25(1) 
4 2 4 1  Law of general application 
According to the test set out in the FNB decision, if there has been a deprivation of a 
property interest, it needs to be consistent with the provisions of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. The first threshold or minimum requirement which must be met for the 
limitation of a right is that the deprivation has to be imposed by law of general 
application. This means that the authorising law in question, the rules governing 
sectional title schemes, has to apply generally and equally. The rule “must not apply 
solely to an individual case, or must not restrict the rights only of specific 
individuals.”526 The law in question, the rules governing sectional title schemes, has 
to be non-arbitrary527 in its application, specific, accessible,528 clear,529 precise530 and 
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apply “impersonally”531 to all. Generally speaking, “[n]on-arbitrariness means that 
where, for example, a rule confers a discretion on an official to limit rights, that 
discretion must be constrained by identifiable legal standards and may not be 
unfettered.”532 
 
Ackermann J finds that the legislation tested in the FNB decision “clearly constitutes 
a law of general application”.533 The legislation in question, the Sectional Titles Act, 
can be seen as law of general application because it is national legislation, applying 
to all sectional title schemes registered under the Act. An act which applies nationally 
should constitute law of general application and regulatory laws, such as the Act in 
question, are usually of a general nature.534 The Sectional Titles Act prescribes 
model management and conduct rules, which can be seen as law of general 
application. The statutorily prescribed model rules are law535 as they are prescribed 
by the Sectional Titles Act, national legislation, which is law of general application 
and as such they are made in execution of the state’s vertical application of 
legislative power.  
 
However, the question remains whether additional, non-prescribed rules, such as 
those amended by a unanimous or special resolution of the body corporate, could 
also be considered to be law of general application. The argument for these 
additional rules as law of general application is that they do not only apply to the 
sectional owners as members of the body corporate, but also to outsiders or third 
parties such as other occupiers and visitors. The sectional owners and other 
occupiers residing in the scheme bear the responsibility of ensuring that these 
outsiders comply with the rules and act accordingly. The Sectional Titles Act 
authorises developers and the body corporate to amend, add to, repeal, substitute 
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and adopt rules suitable to the scheme when necessary.536 Therefore, these rules 
are law of general application.  
 
The question arises whether the rules adopted, amended, added to, substituted and 
repealed by the developer initially and later by the trustees of the body corporate, are 
law.537 These rules are seen as the internal objective law of a private law 
institution.538 The developer as a private person and the body corporate as a private 
body or institution have the authority in terms of the Sectional Titles Act to amend, 
add to, substitute and repeal the model rules and to adopt rules specifically suited to 
meet the needs and requirements of a particular scheme. These adopted rules will 
be applicable to a sectional title scheme in so far as they are not in conflict with the 
statutorily prescribed model rules, whereas the amended model rules will be 
applicable in so far as they are not unconstitutional in their application and effect. 
Therefore, these rules are law. 
 
4 2 4 2 Public interest 
Although section 25(1) does not contain an explicit public purpose requirement, it 
has been argued that a public purpose requirement needs to be read into section 
25(1).539 Foreign law follows the position of strict enforcement of this requirement.540 
In the case of sectional titles, it needs to be asked whether there is a public interest 
requirement that is being fulfilled with the application of the Sectional Titles Act. As 
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discussed in chapter 2,541 sectional title schemes were introduced as an alternative 
to the traditional form of ownership of immovable property because the average 
person was in need of more affordable housing.  
 
It can be seen that there is a public interest in the application of the Act as it attempts 
to provide a workable solution to the housing shortage in South Africa by providing 
security of tenure and fulfilling the psychological need for home ownership.542 
However, due to the nature of sectional title schemes, they do not provide housing to 
lower income groups. Therefore, a more suitable form of housing is necessary in 
order to provide for the housing needs of groups of people that sectional title 
schemes do not provide for. The various types of rules governing sectional title 
schemes are enforced by the trustees of the body corporate in order to ensure that 
the schemes function properly. Therefore, they should be legitimate in as far as they 
effectively serve the purpose for which they were introduced. They should provide an 
alternative form of home ownership, similar to traditional ownership of immovable 
property, but with limitations on the entitlements of use and enjoyment in the interest 
of the community. These limitations should be reasonable and should not restrict the 
sectional owners’ rights and interests to such an extent that would be 
disproportionate to the interest they serve to the community of sectional owners as a 
whole. 
 
4 2 4 3 Arbitrariness 
The deprivation will be considered to be invalid if the law in question, the rules 
prescribed and authorised by the Sectional Titles Act, is arbitrary.543 The deprivation 
will be considered to be arbitrary if the law in question, the various types of rules 
governing sectional title schemes, fails to provide a sufficient reason for the 
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deprivation and / or if it is procedurally unfair.544 Non-compliance with this threshold 
requirement will lead to an invalid limitation. The court determines whether there is a 
sufficient reason for the deprivation by looking for a sufficient nexus. A nexus must 
exist between the purpose for the limitation and the means selected to serve the 
purpose and between the purpose of the law in question and the property and the 
owner in question.545 If there is no or an insufficient nexus, the deprivation is 
arbitrary.  
 
In determining whether there is a sufficient reason for the deprivation, the court must 
look at all the relevant facts of each case,546 “bearing in mind that the enquiry is 
concerned with ‘arbitrary’ in relation to the deprivation of property under section 
25(1).”547 The court must make use of the following factors,548 which serve as useful 
tools in determining whether there is sufficient reason for the deprivation: the 
relationship between the means employed (the deprivation) and the ends sought to 
be achieved (the purpose of the law), the relationship between the purpose for the 
deprivation and the person whose property is affected and the relationship between 
the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the property and the extent of the 
deprivation in terms of that property.549  
 
The Court, in FNB,550 distinguishes between a thin and a thick test for the 
determination of a sufficient reason. The thin test states that a sufficient reason can 
be established by a mere rational relationship between the means employed and the 
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ends sought. The thick test states that sufficient reason must be established by a 
proportionality evaluation which is similar to (but not identical with) that which is 
required by section 36(1). When determining which test applies to a particular 
situation, one needs to consider the nature of the property and the extent of the 
deprivation. When the property in question is the ownership of land and when all the 
entitlements of the owner are affected, a “more compelling”551 purpose will have to 
be established in order for there to be a sufficient reason for the deprivation.  
 
In summary, any law that authorises a deprivation of property must establish 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. This reason must at least be rationally linked to 
a legitimate government purpose and may sometimes have to be justified by 
establishing a proportionate balance between the ends sought and the means 
employed.552  
 
In this context, the various types of rules prescribed or authorised by the Sectional 
Titles Act, authorises a deprivation of property, namely a restriction on the sectional 
owners and occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment, must establish a sufficient 
reason for the deprivation, such as the necessity to form a harmonious community. 
The deprivation must be justified by establishing a proportionate balance between 
the ends sought, namely the regulation of sectional owners’ use rights for the benefit 
of the community and the means employed, namely the rules limiting the 
entitlements of use and enjoyment.  
 
The various types of rules governing sectional title schemes can be seen as a 
regulation of property rights in relation to specific property by a private body, the 
body corporate that is responsible for the enforcement of the rules and compliance 
therewith. These rules are imposed by the body corporate as law of general 
application and are not arbitrary. There is a sufficient reason for the deprivation and 
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it is rationally linked to a legitimate purpose. The rules serve as a normal regulation 
of property rights in the interest of the community of sectional owners.  
 
A few examples of these regulatory rules will be discussed. In terms of section 
44(1)(d) and (e) of the Sectional Titles Act, the rules restricting the behaviour of 
sectional owners, other occupiers and their visitors, must be reasonable in light of 
the Constitution. Therefore, it needs to be determined whether the rules are 
legitimate in their purpose and whether they are reasonably related to that 
purpose.		 The same is true in the case of management rule 68(1)(iv), which is the 
harmonious appearance rule.		 The rule must be reasonable in light of the 
Constitution by being related to a legitimate purpose.			 As mentioned previously, 
one of the main and most attractive features of a sectional title scheme is its 
harmonious appearance. Prospective buyers are interested in purchasing a unit in a 
scheme where all the sections are similar in appearance, neat and well maintained. 
Purchasers want to be assured that their section and share in the common property 
will increase in value and will attract similar interest. Condominium schemes in the 
USA impose restrictions on architectural standards and the use of common facilities. 
In these developments, a standard of reasonableness applies. The court measures 
the restriction and refuses to enforce it if it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.		
  
 
Another example is conduct rule 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act, which prohibits the 
keeping of pets		 in a scheme without written approval of the trustees of the body 
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corporate. The rule prohibiting the keeping of pets must be reasonable in light of the 
Constitution. When the body corporate introduces a rule prohibiting the keeping of 
pets, through amendment, the residents owning pets prior to the amendment may 
keep the pets, but they may not replace them once they die. This is essentially a 
“slow phase-out” of the animals in a scheme.		  
 
According to the court in the South African case of Body Corporate of the Laguna 
Ridge Scheme v Dorse,		 when considering an application to keep pets, the trustees 
should exercise their discretion and should not unreasonably refuse permission. 
They should also consider whether any special circumstances would warrant a 
departure from the general policy of the scheme. The factors that they could take 
into consideration when determining whether the pet would constitute a nuisance 
would include the size, nature and temperament of the pet. The nature of the 
scheme would also be a factor to be taken into consideration.	
 The trustees should 
also consider whether any of the other residents would be inconvenienced or 
whether their peaceful use and enjoyment of their sections would be disturbed and 
whether or not there have been similar pets allowed in the scheme before. The 
trustees may impose conditions to be complied with when allowing the owner or 
occupier to keep a pet and in the event of non-compliance, the trustees may 
withdraw their approval.  
 
An absolute prohibition on the keeping of pets would only be allowed in exceptional 
circumstances. It is within the power of the trustees’ discretion to limit the number 
and kind of pets allowed per section. However, the trustees are not allowed to 
unreasonably withhold their consent. The USA court in Wilshire Condominium 
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Association v Kohlbrand	
 “adopted the view that a restriction against the 
replacement of dogs is reasonably consistent with principles that promote the health, 
happiness and peace of mind of unit owners living in such close proximity.” The court 
decided that a rule prohibiting dogs is generally reasonable and should, therefore, be 
upheld. According to the court in Wilshire, it is not necessary for the association to 
prove that the keeping of dogs constitutes a nuisance, just as the conduct of 
homeowners does not have to “constitute a nuisance in order to justify regulation 
thereof.”	
  
 
Any rule, whether statutorily prescribed model management and conduct rules or 
non-prescribed adopted rules, must be reasonable in its application, serve a 
legitimate purpose or have a sufficient reason for its application and be applied 
equally to all the residents in a scheme. The nature of the scheme and the 
circumstances of each deprivation must be taken into consideration when 
determining whether a rule leads to an arbitrary deprivation of the sectional owners’ 
and occupiers’ entitlements.  
 
4 3 Constitutional validity in light of other rights in the Bill of 
Rights  
4 3 1  Equality 
The fundamental right to equality is protected by the Constitution and legislation 
enacted by Parliament to give effect to it.563 Section 7(1) states that the “Bill of Rights 
is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in 
our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom.” Section 7(2) states that “the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.” This constitutional protection of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights emphasises the importance of ensuring that none of the rights are infringed in 
the application of any legislation. The Sectional Titles Act serves as the example in 
this discussion.   
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Section 39(1) of the Constitution states that “when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. The point of 
departure when interpreting potentially problematic rules in line with the Constitution 
in terms of section 39, is that the duty of the court with the required jurisdiction, to 
test the legislation564 for inconsistency with the Constitution and to declare it invalid if 
it is inconsistent. An important object of constitutional interpretation is to establish 
respect for the supremacy of the Constitution.565 The court can interpret legislation 
on conformity with the Constitution.566 The legislation must be interpreted “through 
the prism of the Bill of Rights.”567  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal568 set out a formula for dealing with constitutional 
challenges to legislation. The court must examine the objects and purport of the act 
or section under consideration; examine the ambit and the meaning of the rights 
protected by the Constitution; and ascertain whether it is reasonably possible to 
interpret the act or section under consideration in such a manner that it conforms 
with the Constitution. If such an interpretation is possible, the court must give effect 
to it but if it is impossible, the court must declare the act or section under 
consideration invalid. The Constitutional Court569 endorsed the Supreme Court of 
Appeal’s approach of reading-down or reading-up of the impugned statutory 
provision in order to prevent it from being struck down because it is unconstitutional. 
Other constitutional remedies upon which the court can rely is severance and 
reading-in.570 With regard to severance, any unconstitutional parts of the impugned 
legislation is severed or cut off from the rest of the legislation and struck down in 
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order to preserve the constitutionally consistent remainder. When reading-in, the 
court inserts a word or phrase into the impugned legislative provision to render it 
constitutional and to avoid it being declared invalid. 
 
The Court, in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 
(hereinafter referred to as SANDU),571 confirmed what Chaskalson CJ said in 
Minister of Health NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd,572 namely that “legislation 
enacted by Parliament to give effect to a constitutional right ought not to be 
ignored.”573 This principle establishes a “subsidiarity rule”.574 The Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (hereinafter referred to as 
PEPUDA)575 is legislation that falls into this category. “The principle expounded by 
the Court is grounded in the norm that ‘to permit the litigant to ignore the legislation 
and rely directly on the constitutional provision would be to fail to recognise the 
important task conferred upon the Legislature by the Constitution to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’”576  
 
PEPUDA was enacted in terms of section 9(4) of the Constitution and seeks to 
regulate unfair discrimination.577 In terms of the subsidiarity principle, as mentioned 
previously, any constitutional enquiries on the validity of provisions that lead to unfair 
discrimination, should first turn to PEPUDA before being referred to the Constitution. 
Therefore, if there is a query regarding the discriminatory effect of a rule governing a 
sectional title scheme, the constitutional validity of the rule will first be tested in terms 
of PEPUDA. 
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In order to determine whether there has been a violation of the equality clause,578 
there are certain “stages” of the enquiry that need to be followed.579 It must firstly be 
determined whether the challenged law differentiates between people. This stage 
encompasses the “threshold test”580 in the determination of violations of the equality 
clause. If differentiation does occur, it needs to be determined whether it bears a 
rational connection581 to a legitimate government purpose. If it does not, the 
differentiation will be a violation of section 9(1). If it does bear a rational connection 
to a legitimate purpose, the differentiation can still be considered as discrimination. 
In this case, it must be determined whether the differentiation amounts to unfair 
discrimination. In order to ascertain this, it must first be concluded that discrimination 
exists.582  
 
Discrimination can either be established on a specified ground or its existence can 
depend objectively on the potential to impair fundamental human dignity or have any 
other adverse effect on it.583 The Court in Harksen v Lane,584  states that not all 
discrimination is unfair. Therefore, the determining factor is the impact of the 
discrimination on its victims. The impact is determined with reference to the purpose 
of the prohibition against discrimination. The Court 585 lists three sets of factors which 
can be taken into account when determining whether discrimination has an unfair 
impact. The Court considers the position of the complainants in society, the nature of 
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the discriminatory law or conduct and the purpose sought to be achieved by it and 
the extent to which the rights of the complainant have been impaired and whether 
there has been an impairment of fundamental dignity. 
 
If it can be established that discrimination does exist, it needs to be determined 
whether such discrimination is unfair.586 As with the establishment of the existence of 
discrimination, unfairness can be established on a specified ground, in which case it 
will be presumed or it can be established by the complainant. The test for 
determining unfairness considers the impact of discrimination on the complainant. If 
the differentiation is found not to be unfair, there will be no violation of section 9(3) or 
9(4) of the Constitution. However, if the discrimination is considered to be unfair, it 
needs to be determined whether it can be justified under the limitation clause.587 
Differentiation, not amounting to discrimination, is only valid if there is no rational 
connection between the differentiation and legitimate purpose.588 
 
The rules governing a sectional title scheme must be reasonable and equally 
applicable to all sectional owners of units which are used for substantially the same 
purpose.589 If these requirements are complied with and the rules are not applied 
arbitrarily, they will be constitutionally valid and enforceable. If there is differentiation 
with regard to the application of the rules, it should be asked whether the 
differentiation bears a rational connection to a legitimate purpose. If the 
differentiation bears no rational connection to a legitimate purpose, it will be contrary 
to section 9(1) of the Constitution, the equality provision, as it amounts to 
discrimination. If the differentiation does bear a rational connection to a legitimate 
purpose, it still amounts to discrimination and will be contrary to section 9(3) and 9(4) 
of the Constitution, unless the discrimination is seen as being fair in terms of section 
9(5) of the Constitution,590 and therefore legitimate. 
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Due to the fact that the by-laws are so far-reaching in their attempt to “achieve a 
harmonious community”,591 they can be seen as being unlimited, which could impose 
a burden on the affected unit owners. Therefore, they need to be “constrained” by 
the Constitution, a statute or the common law.592 The state intervenes at this point in 
order to enforce equality and non-discrimination principles, but this intervention may 
result in limitations to constitutionally entrenched fundamental freedoms. This judicial 
review “preserves the stability and fairness of condominium life without jeopardizing 
the unit owners’ contractual interests.”593 On the other hand, a loss of freedom is 
considered to be “inherent in an intensified community of unit owners living in closer 
proximity to each other.”594 Therefore, those who purchase units in “multi-unit 
developments are often required to surrender significantly greater degrees of 
freedom [in order] to obtain advantages offered by ownership of units in a close-knit 
community.”595 
 
Specific rules with the potential to be unconstitutional will now be discussed with 
reference to relevant case law and a comparative evaluation. Discriminatory conduct 
or management rules of the sectional title scheme are allowed only in a few 
extraordinary circumstances in order to maintain the identity of a community. This is 
done only insofar as the human dignity of others is not infringed.  
 
In the United States of America, certain restrictions are unconstitutional as they 
unfairly discriminate against certain members of the community. Others are 
discriminatory in nature, but they are justified, and therefore not unfair or 
unenforceable. Reasonable restrictions concerning use, occupancy and transfer of 
condominium units are necessary for the operation and protection of owners in a 
condominium scheme, but restrictions that are unevenly enforced violate the equal 
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protection clause and are unenforceable because rules must be enforced equally in 
a scheme to ensure that they do not differentiate between owners and occupiers.  
 
In the USA, in order to determine whether a restriction is valid and enforceable, a 
two stage test is applied. Firstly, the question is asked as to whether the restriction is 
reasonable and secondly, whether the restriction is discriminatory, arbitrary or 
oppressive in its application. Condominium rules are only enforced if they are 
reasonable.596 The board of trustees bears the burden of proving the 
reasonableness of the rule.597 Associations are barred from enforcing rules that are 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that bear no relationship to the health, 
happiness and enjoyment of life of the unit owners.598  
 
As in South Africa, each owner must surrender a measure of personal freedom to 
the regulatory authority of the home owner’s association, which enforces the rules for 
the common good of all the owners.599 If a board does not have the authority in 
terms of a law or condominium documents to enforce rules, the rules will be invalid 
and unenforceable.600 Rules must not be arbitrarily enforced, they must not have a 
discriminatory effect,601 they must be enacted in good faith and they must be 
adopted for the common welfare of the owners and occupants of the 
condominium.602  
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If a sectional title scheme in South Africa had to implement a rule prohibiting a 
certain race or limiting the scheme to a particular race, it would be unenforceable 
because the equality clause prohibits unfair discrimination. This is an application of 
the strict test used to determine unfair discrimination in especially race and gender 
issues. If either the prescribed management or conduct rules, house rules or rules 
added to and amended by the developer or the body corporate amounts to an unfair 
discrimination in terms of section 9 of the Constitution, they will be unreasonable in 
terms of section 35(3) of the Sectional Titles Act. The offending rule will be struck 
down due to its invalidity in terms of the Act and not due to its unconstitutional 
invalidity.603  
 
If the discrimination is not unfair, it will not be unreasonable as long as it serves a 
legitimate purpose in light of the Constitution. In terms of balancing the competing 
interests in this regard, it is “questionable whether the interest in not living with 
members of a different race or ethnic origin can be considered a legitimate purpose 
in a multi-ethnic society.”604 The constitutionally protected principles of contractual 
freedom and private autonomy will be outweighed by the founding values of the 
Constitution. Therefore, racial discrimination will not be linked to a legitimate purpose 
because equality and “non-racialism” is considered “the most basic values” of the 
Constitution,605 which is “clear from the explicit constitutional acknowledgement of 
South Africa’s history.”606 Racial discrimination is seen as “absolutely contrary to the 
founding values of the Constitution”607 and any rule fostering such discrimination will 
not be reasonable in light of the Constitution. The core democratic values, as set out 
in the Constitution, are the right to human dignity, the achievement of equality, the 
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advancement of human rights and freedoms. These are the “guiding values”608 in the 
interpretation609 and limitation610 of rights.  
 
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education,611 the Court held that 
when determining whether certain restrictions on the right to equality were 
unconstitutional, it involved a “context sensitive balancing test” where the context in 
which the restriction occurred and the reason for such restriction would be 
considered. However, in the case of restrictions on the grounds of race and gender, 
a “strict scrutiny test”612 was used, which made justifying these infringements 
impossible. In some condominium schemes in the USA, the homeowners 
associations institutes rule limiting prospective purchasers to those who will be 
compatible with the racial composition of the community. These rules amount to 
racial discrimination that will be unconstitutional in the South African context.613 
 
A rule resulting in discrimination based on ethnic or social origin would likely be 
unreasonable for the same reasons as in the case of rules amounting to racial 
discrimination. In some condominium schemes in the USA, rules have been adopted 
that prevent prospective purchasers, who do not conform to the social composition of 
the community, from buying a unit in the scheme.614 These rules would probably also 
be unconstitutional in the South African context. 
 
In order to determine whether discrimination based on gender will be reasonable, 
there must be a “clearly discernible reason for the rule in order to render its 
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discriminatory nature reasonable.615 A rule prohibiting a particular gender or limiting 
a scheme to one gender will be reasonable and valid, provided it serves a legitimate 
purpose.   
 
In South Africa, there is no legitimate purpose in light of the Constitution that could 
render a rule amounting to discrimination based on marital status616 or on the basis 
of sexual orientation valid. The likely purpose behind introducing a rule such as the 
former would be to impose a higher moral standard which is insufficient to uphold a 
restriction of this nature, and therefore it would be unconstitutional in light of the 
Constitution. In the USA, condominium schemes have been known to introduce rules 
limiting residence to single families617 or traditionally married couples and prohibiting 
cohabitation by unrelated persons.618 In light of South Africa’s historical context, the 
role of dignity, as a founding value, is very important when testing whether 
restrictions amount to unfair discriminatory regulations that are unconstitutional and 
invalid.619  
 
The South African courts have held that if a rule is not reasonably applied but 
selectively or arbitrarily enforced, it will be contrary to section 35(3) of the Sectional 
Titles Act, which states that any rule must “apply equally to all owners of units put to 
substantially the same purpose”. Rules limiting residence in a scheme to persons of 
a certain age620 or rules prohibiting certain age groups from taking up residence in a 
scheme,621 result in discrimination. The rule will either be struck down or the court 
must determine whether the rule is reasonable in light of the Constitution, by 
weighing up the conflicting rights and interests involved.622  
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The decisive question in this regard is whether the purpose served by the rule 
amounting to discrimination based on age is sufficiently legitimate to render it 
reasonable. Therefore, age restrictions can be considered reasonable in light of the 
Constitution if they are related to the legitimate purpose of providing appropriate 
facilities to meet the differing housing needs and desires of the varying age groups. If 
a sectional title scheme is established to provide for the needs of the elderly and 
retired, a restriction limiting residence to people over a certain age, will be 
reasonable. However, the average sectional title scheme would not be able to 
prohibit families with small children. 
 
 In the USA, age restrictions are seen as reasonable if the “mischievousness” and 
“rowdiness” of children and the purpose of creating a tranquil neighbourhood, by 
eliminating noise associated with children, are taken into consideration.623 In White 
Egret Condominium Inc v Franklin,624 the court found that age limitations or 
restrictions are “reasonable means to accomplish the lawful purpose of providing 
appropriate facilities for the differing housing needs and desires of the varying age 
groups,” but the court also found that not all age restrictions should be considered 
reasonable. The court found that “these age restrictions can’t be used to 
unreasonably or arbitrarily restrict certain classes of individuals from obtaining 
desirable housing.” According to the court, restrictions on age and rules limiting 
residence in a community to adults625 may be justified even though they amount to 
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age discrimination, as long as they have uniform enforcement626 and not be 
arbitrarily or unreasonably applied.627 They must also be aimed at maintaining a 
community consisting of senior citizens628 and not merely aimed at excluding 
children as permanent residents.629 In general, the USA courts find these restrictions 
reasonable, but in some cases the courts have refused to uphold age restrictions as 
they discriminatory and unreasonably applied.630  
 
Rules discriminating on the basis of religion, conscience and / or belief will be 
unreasonable in light of the Constitution if they prohibit residents of a particular 
religion, but rules limiting residence to a particular religious group may serve a 
legitimate purpose even though they are discriminatory. The purpose for this 
limitation needs to be sufficiently legitimate to render it reasonable.631 Section 15(1) 
of the Constitution states that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, 
religion, thought, belief and opinion.” Section 31(1) provides that “persons belonging 
to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other 
members of that community – (a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use 
their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society.”  If the limitation serves a sufficiently 
legitimate purpose, the rule will be reasonable and upheld. However, this does not 
serve as a general principle. The court needs to consider the circumstances of each 
particular case and not allow the rules to operate as a “guise” for discriminating 
against another religion.632 In the USA rules limiting prospective purchasers to those 
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compatible with the religious,633 philosophical634 or social composition of the 
community635 amounts to discrimination. 
 
The point of departure is that the rules governing sectional title schemes must apply 
equally to all residents in a scheme and to prospective purchasers. The rules may 
not differentiate between certain groups of people in its application. However, if the 
rules do differentiate, there must be a rational connection to a legitimate purpose 
before it will be permissible. For example, a sectional title scheme providing for the 
needs of the elderly and retired may prohibit residents below a certain age. This 
differentiation will be valid as it serves a legitimate purpose, providing suitable 
accommodation for the elderly in the form of a retirement scheme. The rule 
restricting occupation will be discriminatory in its application but it will not be unfair 
discrimination because there is a rational connection to a legitimate purpose. 
Therefore, the rule will be constitutionally valid. 
 
4 3 2  Just administrative action 
Section 1(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act636 (hereinafter referred to 
as PAJA) defines administrative action as  
“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision by (a) an organ of state, when (i) 
exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution or (ii) exercising 
a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation or (b) a natural 
or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision, which adversely affects 
the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect”. 
 
Apart from the statutorily prescribed rules governing sectional title schemes, 
developers and later the body corporate may add to or amend the rules in 
accordance with what is needed for the scheme in question. Management rule 28(2) 
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of the Sectional Titles Act provides that the trustees, as representatives of the body 
corporate “shall do all things reasonably necessary for the control, management and 
administration of the common property in terms of the powers conferred upon the 
body corporate”. In order to fulfil their responsibilities, they need to make rules 
suitable to the needs of their scheme.  
 
The exercise of the trustees’ statutorily prescribed authority can be demonstrated by 
their ability to prescribe house rules which regulate the control, use, safety and 
cleanliness of the common property.637 These rules are seen as more flexible than 
those that are statutorily prescribed. Therefore, they serve as effective tools to 
regulate practical problems as they arise in the daily management of the scheme 
because they may be amended by the trustees on short notice. House rules are 
enforceable when they comply with two requirements of legitimacy. Firstly, they must 
be an exercise of the trustees’ powers of control over the common property or 
permission given by the trustees exercising their discretion.638 Furthermore, they 
may not be objectionable in the way they restrict the rights of sectional owners639 
and they may not be in conflict with the statutorily prescribed conduct and 
management rules.  
 
In order to determine whether the making of these rules qualify as administrative 
action, it is necessary to refer to the definition of administrative action as defined in 
section 1(1) of PAJA. The trustees are empowered in terms of management rule 25 
to perform and exercise the duties and powers of the body corporate in terms of the 
rules. This mandate permits them to make decisions in the interest of the community 
of sectional owners.  
 
However, it is first necessary to determine whether the making of rules can be 
defined as a “decision” in terms of PAJA. The court in New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd v 
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Tshabalala-Msimang640 found that “regulations could not be regarded as a decision 
under PAJA, partly because rulemaking was not listed in the definition and partly on 
the basis of other indications that rulemaking was intended to be excluded from the 
purview of PAJA.”641 However, in a dissenting judgement, it was reasoned that 
“PAJA would be unconstitutional if it did not cover rule-making, for it would fail to give 
effect to the terms of section 33(1) of the Constitution.”642 The Supreme Court of 
Appeal643 and the Constitutional Court644 did not deal with the question. However, 
the minority in the Constitutional Court, “strongly supported the view that the making 
of regulations fell within the scope of administrative action in section 33 of the 
Constitution” and “found that the references to any decision of an administrative 
nature and doing or refusing to do any other act or thing of an administrative nature 
brought regulation-making within the scope of the definition of a decision.”645 
Therefore, if the majority judgement is followed, the trustees’ making of rules is not 
taking a decision as defined by PAJA. 
 
Secondly, it must be determined whether the trustees can be defined as firstly, an 
organ of state; either exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution or exercising a public function in terms of any legislation; or secondly, a 
natural or juristic person when exercising a public power or performing a public 
function in terms of an empowering provision. At first glance, it can be seen that if 
the trustees could be defined as an organ of state, they would not be exercising a 
power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution. They would rather be 
exercising a public function in terms of legislation, namely the Sectional Titles Act, as 
can be seen by section 239(b) of the Constitution, which describes an organ of state 
as “any other functionary or institution (ii) exercising a public power or performing a 
public function in terms of any legislation.” If this were the case, administrative law 
would apply to their actions.  
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However, it is debatable whether trustees exercise a public power or perform a 
public function. The body corporate is a private institution and its membership 
consists of all the sectional owners in a scheme and its powers, duties and functions 
are performed by a board of trustees, who represent the sectional owners in this 
private scheme. Although the trustees interact with many outsiders or third parties 
who are not members of the scheme, such as visitors, they still do not exercise a 
public power or perform a public function to the general public as a whole but rather 
to the community which they represent. The trustees, by enforcing rules and 
ensuring compliance therewith, regulate the property rights in respect of specific 
property, as a private body and not in the general regulation of property. Therefore, 
trustees’ do not fall under the second part of the definition of organ of state.  
 
Seeing as trustees cannot be described as organs of state, it needs to determined 
whether they can be defined as either a natural or a juristic person, exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision. 
The trustees are representatives of the body corporate, which is a juristic person but, 
as was mentioned above, the trustees do not exercise a public power or perform a 
public function, even though they are empowered to perform valid acts646 in terms of 
an empowering provision, the Sectional Titles Act.  
Therefore, in terms of the definition of administrative action in section 1(1) of PAJA, 
the making of rules by the trustees does not qualify as administrative action. 
 
4 3 3  Access to courts 
Section 34 of the Constitution provides that “everyone has the right to have any 
dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing 
before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum.” Sectional title schemes function as a community of sectional owners, forming 
a body corporate, which is represented by the elected trustees, who administer, 
control and manage the scheme in the interests of the community, through the 
enforcement of the rules.  
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Due to this unique structure and restrictive nature of sectional title schemes, disputes 
often arise between the trustees and the members of the body corporate, or the 
members of the body corporate inter se. These disputes arise out of or are in 
connection with the Sectional Titles Act or the management and conduct rules.647  
 
It can be argued that as provided in section 34 of the Constitution, a dispute can be 
referred to an alternative tribunal or forum other than a court. According to 
management rule 71(1) of the Act, any dispute, except where an interdict or other 
urgent relief is sought from a court, will be determined in terms of the management 
rule, which provides for the determination of disputes by arbitration.  
 
Therefore, statutory provision is made for disputes to first be resolved by internal 
remedies such as arbitration, before it can be referred to an external channel, such 
as a court with jurisdiction as provided for in section 34 of the Constitution.648  
 
4 4 Concluding remarks 
Sectional owners have an ownership entitlement in their section. They have the 
entitlement of use and enjoyment in their sections and proportionate share of the 
common property. Other occupiers have an interest in property in the form of their 
entitlements of use and enjoyment of their sections and their share in the common 
property of the sectional title scheme. The statutorily prescribed conduct and 
management rules, the house rules and the rules which are added to and amended 
by the developer or later by the body corporate through the required resolutions, are 
all-encompassing and provide for the control, management, administration, use and 
enjoyment of the sections and the common property. They serve as regulations of 
and limitations on the sectional owners and occupiers property rights and deprive 
them of some of their entitlements.  
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The question of constitutionality arises when it needs to be determined to what 
extent these restrictive rules infringe on constitutional rights and whether they are 
constitutionally permissible. Section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that when 
legislation is interpreted, fundamental rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights must be 
upheld. In order to determine whether the rules governing sectional title schemes are 
constitutionally valid and permissible, a section 25(1) constitutional inquiry is first of 
all needed.  
 
In this chapter, the focus was on two constitutional enquiries. Firstly, the emphasis 
was placed on the constitutional validity of the prescribed rules governing sectional 
title schemes. It needed to be determined whether the application of the rules 
amounted to arbitrary deprivations of property. It also needed to be determined 
whether these deprivations would be unenforceable due to its constitutional invalidity 
or whether they would be justified in terms of section 25(1), the specific limitation 
clause or in terms of section 36(1), the general limitation clause, provided the 
requirements were complied with. 
 
The second constitutional enquiry focussed on the fact that the rules applicable to 
sectional title schemes need to uphold other fundamental rights entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights. In order to accomplish this, conflicting interests need to be balanced 
against one another and in light of the Constitution. The fundamental rights tested in 
this regard were the right to equality, just administrative action and access to court.  
 
A comparative approach was followed, using similar provisions in the United States 
of America as an example of how rules are introduced and enforced in condominium 
schemes and how the courts test whether or not they are reasonable and 
enforceable in light of the Constitution, bearing in mind, the competing interests of 
the owners in such communal developments. In order to determine if a restriction is 
justified, the court considers the facts of each case because certain infringements 
are deemed to be more severe than others. 
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In this comparative discussion, it was found that the statutorily prescribed rules 
governing sectional title schemes, house rules as well as those amended by the 
developer or the body corporate, serve as regulations. These regulations are found 
to be deprivations of the sectional owners’ ownership entitlement of use and 
enjoyment as well as the occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment of their 
sections and their share in the common property of the sectional title scheme. These 
deprivations were found to be reasonable in so far as they contribute to a 
harmonious relationship between the body corporate and the sectional owners and 
the sectional owners inter se. In sectional title communities, it is considered 
important to have effective regulations in place which will ensure that the community 
operates efficiently and to the benefit of all the members of the body corporate. 
However, the rules will step over the bounds of reasonableness if they are excessive 
in their regulation. 
 
The rules as amended by either the developer or the body corporate have the 
potential of being unconstitutional in this regard. Therefore, the trustees need to be 
aware and prohibit the implementation of such rules. In terms of the constitutional 
validity of the rules in light of the Bill of Rights, the rules are found to be reasonable 
and valid as long as they do not unfairly differentiate between certain groups on the 
grounds as mentioned in the Constitution as this will be unfair discrimination which is 
considered unreasonable, invalid and constitutionally impermissible. In these 
instances, it will be very difficult to justify any infringements of the rights guaranteed 
in the Bill of Rights. 
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5 Conclusion  
5 1 Introduction  
This evaluative discussion set out to answer the research question posed in the 
introductory chapter,649 namely whether the various types of rules governing 
sectional title schemes are constitutionally valid.650 The introductory chapter 
mentioned the different types of rules applicable in sectional title schemes. These 
rules were further discussed and evaluated in the remaining chapters. The model 
management651 and conduct652 rules prescribed by the Sectional Titles Act653 and 
the rules substituted, added to, amended or repealed by either the developer initially 
before the establishment of the body corporate or later by the trustees of the body 
corporate of a sectional title scheme, were evaluated in terms of their constitutional 
validity. 
 
To adequately answer the research question posed, the applicable rules required 
examination to determine whether any were unconstitutional and invalid in their 
application and effect. A comparative approach was followed to aid this constitutional 
evaluation. Reference was made to Australia, Germany, Israel and the United States 
of America as comparative jurisdictions. The relevance of each jurisdiction was 
further discussed where relevant in each chapter.   
 
In the introductory chapter, the hypothesis stated that it is expected that the model 
management and conduct rules, as statutorily prescribed by the Sectional Titles Act, 
the rules initially adopted by the developer and those later amended and substituted 
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by the trustees of the body corporate of the sectional title scheme, restrict the rights 
and the entitlements of the owners and other occupiers in the scheme. Each 
sectional owner and other occupier has a right or entitlement to use and enjoy their 
individual sections and share in the common property. In the case of the sectional 
owners, the rights of use and enjoyment stems from their entitlement of ownership. 
With regard to other occupiers, the entitlement of use and enjoyment accompanies 
their right to occupy the section in terms of a contractual relationship with the 
sectional owner.  
 
There is an assumption that these entitlements are limited by enforcement of the 
various rules governing the sectional title scheme. In some instances the application 
of the rules might exceed the bounds of reasonableness and result in unfair 
discrimination, arbitrary deprivation, unfair administrative action and restrictions on 
access to courts for dispute resolution. If it is found that certain rules are 
unreasonable in their application, based on one or more of these grounds, these 
potentially problematic rules must be interpreted in line with section 39 of the 
Constitution. It is the duty of the court to test the legislation654 for inconsistency with 
the Constitution and to declare it invalid if it is inconsistent. This is known as reading-
up or reading-down. Other constitutional remedies upon which the court can rely is 
severance and reading-in.655 These impermissible rules will need to be repealed and 
replaced, amended or substituted with rules that are constitutionally valid in their 
application and effect.  
 
Through a statutory analysis,656 it was determined that the sectional owners’ and 
other occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment of their individual sections and 
accompanying share in the common property, are indeed limited by the various 
different types of rules governing sectional title schemes. These rules restrict and 
bind each member of the body corporate. Several examples of the more problematic 
restrictive rules have been examined and the limitation of the entitlements tested 
                                            
654
 The court must test the potentially problematic statutorily prescribed or non-prescribed rule for 
inconsistency with the Constitution. 
655
 Du Plessis L “Interpretation” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M Constitutional Law of South 
Africa Vol 2 (2nd ed 2009) 32.141. See the discussion in chapter 4 under the heading 4 3 1. 
656
 Refer to chapter 3. 

 
against constitutional provisions to determine their constitutional validity. The model 
management and conduct rules that are looked at more closely are the following: the 
conduct rule preventing a sectional owner or occupier from keeping a pet without the 
written consent of the trustees,657 the rules ensuring the harmonious appearance of 
the sectional title scheme,658 the rules regulating noise and nuisance within the 
scheme,659 and the conduct and management rules regulating the use and misuse of 
a section.660 These rules serve as examples of how the Sectional Titles Act 
prescribes restrictions which limit the sectional owners’ ownership entitlements as 
well as the entitlements of other occupiers to use and enjoy their sections and share 
in the common property. Most of the rules are valid in so far as they are reasonable 
in their application and are applied equally to the sectional owners and other 
occupiers in the scheme.  
 
For example, section 44(1)(d) of the Sectional Titles Act states that an owner shall 
“use and enjoy the common property in such a manner as not unreasonably to 
interfere with the use and enjoyment thereof by other owners or other persons 
lawfully on the premises.” This rule prohibits the sectional owners and other 
occupiers from behaving in a way that will disturb the use and enjoyment of the 
sections and common property by other sectional owners, occupiers and other 
persons lawfully on the premises.661 Therefore, it restricts their entitlements of use 
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 Annex 9 rule 1. See also Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme v Dorse 1999 (2) SA 512 
(D), where the court explained the trustee’s discretion when determining whether a pet should be 
allowed in the scheme. See further the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 3. 
658
 Annex 8 rule 68(1)(iv) and Annex 9 rules 5, 6 and 8. See also Essa NO v Body Corporate of 
Kingsway House (9931/2008) [2009] ZAKZHC 5 (20 February 2009), where the body corporate of a 
sectional scheme sought a court order prohibiting a sectional owner from erecting advertising signs 
on the common property of the scheme. See further the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 
2 4. 
659
 Ss 44(1)(d) and 44(1)(e). See the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 5. 
660
 S 44(1)(g) and Annex 8 rule 68(1)(i). See also Bonthuys v Scheepers (CA 303/2006) [2007] 
ZAECHC 68 (17 April 2007); Cujé-Jakoby v Kaschub 2007 (3) SA 345 (C), and Body Corporate of the 
Tuzla Mews Scheme v Yang [2001] 3 All SA 427 (W). See further the discussion in chapter 3 under 
the heading 3 3 2 6. 
661
 Refer to the discussion of these rules in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 6. See chapter 4 under 
the heading 4 2 3. See further s44(1)(e) of the Sectional Titles Act, which states that an owner shall 
“not use his section or exclusive use area, or permit it to be used, in such a manner or for such a 
purpose as shall cause a nuisance to any occupier of a section.” As long as this rule is applied 
equally, it will be legitimate. See further Management rule 68(1)(i), which provides that an owner “shall 
not use his section, exclusive use area or any part of the common property, or permit it to be used, in 
such a manner or for such purpose as shall be injurious to the reputation of the building.” 
Management rule 68(1)(iv) provides that an owner “shall not do anything to his section or exclusive 
use area which is likely to prejudice the harmonious appearance of the building.” These rules are valid 
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and enjoyment of their own section and share in the common property. However, 
compliance with this rule ensures that all the residents living in a scheme will form a 
harmonious community, with the least cause for conflict and disputes. Therefore, this 
rule serves a legitimate aim and will be reasonable in so far as it is applied equally to 
all residents in the scheme. 
 
However, when the rules are so restrictive as to limit any of the rights entrenched in 
the Constitution, these potentially problematic rules must be interpreted in line with 
section 39 of the Constitution. It is the duty of the court to test the legislation662 for 
inconsistency with the Constitution and to declare it invalid if it is inconsistent. This is 
known as reading-up or reading-down. Other constitutional remedies upon which the 
court can rely is severance and reading-in.663 If the interpretation fails, a 
constitutional analysis664 is required. Various restrictive rules were tested against the 
property clause665 and other non-property fundamental rights666 entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights to determine whether they were constitutionally valid or whether they 
were unreasonable, unconstitutional and needed to be repealed and replaced, 
amended or substituted.  
 
For example, a sectional title scheme providing for the needs of the elderly and 
retired may prohibit residents below a certain age. This differentiation will be valid as 
it serves a legitimate purpose, providing suitable accommodation for the elderly in 
the form of a retirement scheme. The rule restricting occupation will be 
discriminatory in its application, but it will not be unfair discrimination because there 
is a rational connection to a legitimate purpose. Therefore, the rule will be 
constitutionally valid. 
  
                                                                                                                                       
as they provide the surety required by prospective purchasers and current sectional owners that their 
units in the scheme will increase in value and attract potential purchasers. 
662
 The court must test the potentially problematic statutorily prescribed or non-prescribed rule for 
inconsistency with the Constitution. 
663
 Du Plessis L “Interpretation” in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M Constitutional Law of South 
Africa Vol 2 (2nd ed 2009) 32.141. See the discussion in chapter 4 under the heading 4 3 1. 
664
 Refer to chapter 4. 
665
 S 25(1) of the Constitution. 
666
 Ss 9, 33 and 34. 
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5 2 Overview of chapters  
Chapter one, the introductory chapter, began by posing the research question. It 
introduced the hypothesis, listed and explained the methodology employed 
throughout the thesis, gave a brief overview of the chapters and introduced the main 
issues that were dealt with in each chapter. 
 
In chapter two, there was a comparative discussion of the historical background of 
the immovable property ownership system in South Africa. This discussion focused 
on the period before the introduction of separate ownership of a part or section of 
land or a building, as in sectional title schemes. The common law position was 
discussed, with reference to its principles of ownership667 and their subsequent 
amendment in the case of sectional titles. This amendment served as an adaptation 
of the application of the principles to sectional title schemes, which were an 
alternative form of immovable property ownership. Firstly, the common law principle, 
superficies solo cedit, was repealed in the case of sectional titles. This principle 
restricted the separate ownership of parts of a building and land as with sectional 
titles because the person owning the piece of land automatically owns the buildings 
permanently built on the land.668 Due to the fact that this principle became part of 
Roman-Dutch common law initially and later South African law, it needed to be 
repealed in order for sectional titles to be introduced. According to Roman law, land 
was undefined horizontally and ownership of different levels or “strata”669 was 
unknown. By repealing the common law principle cuius est solum, as defined above, 
in the case of sectional titles, a section owned by the sectional owner was described 
both in terms of the vertical boundaries and horizontal subdivisions. Sectional 
ownership introduced horizontal subdivision by defining the boundaries of a section 
                                            
667
 Superficies solo cedit (omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit); cuius est solum eius est usque ad 
coelum and plena in re potestas. See chapter 2 for a further discussion on the definition and 
application of these common law principles. 



 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership. The transformation of the concept of ownership as 
plena in re potestas (1984) 58. See further  Van Wezel v van Wezel’s Trustee 1924 AD 409 at 417, 
where Wessels JA stated that “as soon as a structure is built into the soil it acceded to the soil; for by 
Civil Law as by the Roman-Dutch law the accessory has the same character as the thing to which it 
acceded”; Durban Corporation v Lincoln 1940 AD 36 at 42, where Watermeyer JA stated that “in law 
a building acceded to the land – it is not separate property and cannot be owned as a thing separated 
or disconnected from the  land on which it stands” and MacDonald Ltd v Radin and the Potchefstroom 
Dairies and Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454. 



 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership. The transformation of the concept of ownership as 
plena in re potestas (1984) 55. 
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as the median line of dividing the floors, walls and ceilings.670 According to the 
common law principle, plena in re potestas, the traditional concept of ownership was 
seen as “autonomous”,671 “individualistic”672 and “unrestricted”.673 With the 
introduction of sectional titles, there has been a move away from this traditional 
concept of landownership towards a more communal and restricted form of home 
ownership where the rights and interests of all residents living in a scheme are 
upheld.  
 
The main reasons for the introduction of legislation, making provision for sectional 
ownership were examined, as well as when and how this legislation was introduced. 
The purpose, effect and success of the legislation were also discussed. Australia, 
Germany and Israel were chosen as comparative jurisdictions because they each 
faced similar challenges to those found in South Africa at the time when need arose 
for an alternative form of immovable property ownership. There were also similarities 
between their systems of separate ownership of a part or section of land or a 
building and sectional ownership in South Africa. The choice of each jurisdiction was 
explained with reference to examples where relevant in the chapter. A comparative 
approach was followed throughout the chapter as each comparative jurisdiction has 
particular useful and successful suggestions that the South African legislature can 
follow in future. 
 
In chapter three, a statutory analysis and a comparative survey were used to 
describe the various types of rules governing a sectional title scheme. In this 
chapter, the focus of the discussion was on where the rules can be found, the types 
of rules applicable, the legal nature of the rules in operation and the limitations that 
they impose. Sectional title schemes are governed by two sets of rules which restrict 
the property rights of sectional owners, successors in title and other occupiers who 
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plena in re potestas (1984) 56. 
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are resident in a scheme. Firstly, model conduct and management rules are 
statutorily prescribed in the Sectional Titles Act. These rules are applicable in so far 
as they are constitutionally valid.  They can be amended, added to, substituted and 
repealed by either the developer initially or later by the body corporate. These rules 
are applicable in so far as they are not in conflict with the prescribed rules in 
operation within the scheme. Secondly, the trustees of the body corporate can adopt 
non-prescribed rules by resolution of the members of the body corporate. These 
adopted rules are applicable in so far as they are not in conflict with the prescribed 
rules. They are seen as being the internal objective law of a private law institution. 
Reference was also made to the amendment procedure, the operation and scope of 
application of the rules, the enforcement mechanisms available, the sanctions for 
non-compliance, disputes and the various methods of dispute resolution that can be 
used.  
 
Various examples of restrictive rules were identified in this chapter.  The rules that 
will be looked at more closely are the following: the conduct rule preventing a 
sectional owner or occupier from keeping a pet without the written consent of the 
trustees,674 the harmonious appearance rule,675 the rules regulating noise and 
nuisance,676 and the conduct and management rules regulating the use and misuse 
of a section.677 The trustees of the body corporate are vested with judicial discretion 
to grant or refuse permission to keep pets in a sectional title scheme and to grant or 
refuse permission to change the use of a section in a scheme. The trustees must 
consider all the special circumstances of each case in order to warrant a departure 
from the general policy. This judicial discretion must be exercised reasonably. There 
is an absolute prohibition that a sectional owner and other occupier’s may not do 
anything in the section or on the common property that will detrimentally affect the 
aesthetic appeal of a scheme or cause noise or other forms of nuisance. Sectional 
title schemes are usually of a higher density that other forms of home ownership and 
as such strict control needs to be exercised over the conduct of the residents in 
order to ensure that the community functions as a harmonious whole.  
                                            
674
 Annex 9 rule 1.  
675
 Annex 9 rule 5 and Annex 8 rule 68(1)(iv). 
676
 Ss 44(1)(d) and 44(1)(e). 
677
 S 44(1)(g) and Annex 8 rule 68(1)(i). 
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It was argued that these rules could in some cases exceed the bounds of 
reasonableness, making it necessary for the court to step in and fulfil its duty as 
mandated by section 39 of the Constitution by interpreting the rules in order to avoid 
a declaration of invalidity. If the interpretation fails and none of the constitutional 
remedies are applicable, it will be necessary to evaluate the rules in light of the 
Constitution to ensure that rules which are contrary to the fundamental rights 
entrenched in the Constitution are declared invalid and unenforceable. The rules 
must be applied equally within the scheme in order for it to be a reasonable 
restriction of the property rights and entitlements of the sectional owners and other 
occupiers residing in the scheme. In most cases, the rules are reasonable as they 
serve to ensure that the community of sectional owners and other occupiers live in 
an efficiently functioning community where disputes and other conflicts are avoided 
to the advantage of the community as a whole. The following chapter continues by 
testing these rules in terms of their constitutional validity. 
  
In chapter four, a constitutional analysis was used to determine to what extent the 
restrictive rules infringe on constitutional rights and whether these rules are 
constitutionally permissible. The rules are all-encompassing and provide for the 
control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of the sections and the 
common property. They serve as regulations of and limitations on the sectional 
owners’ and occupiers’ property rights, depriving them of their entitlements of use 
and enjoyment of their individual sections and share in the common property. In this 
chapter, the focus was on two constitutional enquiries.  
 
Firstly, the emphasis was placed on the constitutional validity of the rules governing 
sectional title schemes. It needed to be determined whether the application of the 
rules amounted to arbitrary deprivations of property. It also needed to be determined 
whether these deprivations would be unenforceable due to its constitutional invalidity 
or whether they would be justified in terms of the property clause.678 The second 
constitutional enquiry focussed on the fact that the rules applicable to sectional title 
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schemes need to uphold various non-property rights679 as entrenched in the Bill of 
Rights. A comparative approach was followed, using similar provisions in the United 
States of America as an example of how rules are introduced and enforced in 
condominium schemes and how the courts test whether or not they are reasonable 
and enforceable in light of the Constitution. In this chapter, the statutorily prescribed 
model rules tested in terms of their constitutional validity were constitutionally valid in 
so far as they were applied equally within a scheme and were reasonable in their 
application and effect. The non-prescribed rules adopted by either the developer 
initially or later by the body corporate, can be more problematic as these rules are 
adopted to meet the specific needs and requirements of a particular scheme and as 
such, they need to be considered in light of the nature of the particular scheme in 
question. These rules will be applicable in so far as they are applied equally and are 
reasonable in their application and effect but most importantly, they must not be in 
conflict with any of the statutorily prescribed rules. 
 
As mentioned previously, certain model rules were highlighted as potentially 
problematic restrictions and tested in terms of their constitutional validity. The first 
example of a set of statutorily prescribed rules which deprive an owner or occupier of 
their entitlements of use and enjoyment is sections 44(1)(d) and (e) of the Sectional 
Titles Act, which sets out the duties of the owners and occupiers of sections. These 
obligations interfere with the sectional owners’ and occupiers’ entitlements of use 
and enjoyment. Section 44(1)(d) states that an owner shall “use and enjoy the 
common property in such a manner as not unreasonably to interfere with the use 
and enjoyment thereof by other owners or other persons lawfully on the premises.” 
This rule requires sectional owners and occupiers to behave in a way that will not 
disturb the use and enjoyment of the sections and common property by other 
sectional owners, occupiers and other persons lawfully on the premises.
 
Compliance with this rule ensures that all the residents living in a scheme will form a 
harmonious community, with the least cause for conflict and disputes. Therefore, this 
rule serves a legitimate aim and will be reasonable in so far as it is applied equally to 
all residents in the scheme. Section 44(1)(e) of the Sectional Titles Act, states that 
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 Ss 9, 33 and 34. 
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 Refer to the discussion of these rules in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 6. 
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an owner shall “not use his section or exclusive use area, or permit it to be used, in 
such a manner or for such a purpose as shall cause a nuisance to any occupier of a 
section.” This rule prohibits any behaviour or activity that may reasonably be 
perceived as causing a nuisance to other sectional owners and occupiers. This rule 
can be seen as being a legitimate limitation of the sectional owners’ and other 
occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment because compliance with the rule will 
ensure that causes for disputes do not arise.

Management rule 68(1)(i) provides that an owner “shall not use his section, exclusive 
use area or any part of the common property, or permit it to be used, in such a 
manner or for such purpose as shall be injurious to the reputation of the building.” 
Management rule 68(1)(iv)
 provides that an owner “shall not do anything to his 
section or exclusive use area which is likely to prejudice the harmonious appearance 
of the building.” The model conduct rules in Annexure 9 of the Sectional Titles Act, 
further limit the sectional owner or occupier’s entitlement of use and enjoyment. 
Conduct rule 1(1) states that “an owner or occupier shall not, without the consent in 
writing of the trustees, which approval may not be unreasonably withheld, keep any 
animal, reptile or bird in a section or on the common property.”
 Conduct rule 3 
prohibits any sectional owner or occupier from parking or leaving their vehicles 
anywhere on the common property.
 Conduct rule 4 prohibits any alterations to the 
common property.
 Conduct rule 5 prohibits any conduct that would lead to an 
aesthetically displeasing or undesirable effect when view from the outside of the 
scheme.
	 One of the main and most attractive features of a sectional title scheme is 
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 See further Annex 9 rules 5, 6 and 8. 
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 Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme v Dorse 1999 (2) SA 512 (D). See further the 
discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 3. 
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 Refer to the discussion of the harmonious appearance rule. See Annex 8 rule 68(1)(iv) and Annex 
9 rules 5, 6 and 8. See also Essa NO v Body Corporate of Kingsway House (9931/2008) [2009] 
ZAKZHC 5 (20 February 2009), where the body corporate of a sectional scheme sought a court order 
prohibiting a sectional owner from erecting advertising signs on the common property of the scheme. 
See further the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 2 4. 
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 Refer to the discussion of the harmonious appearance rule. See also Essa NO v Body Corporate 
of Kingsway House (9931/2008) [2009] ZAKZHC 5 (20 February 2009), where the body corporate of a 
sectional scheme sought a court order prohibiting a sectional owner from erecting advertising signs 
on the common property of the scheme. See further the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 
2 4. 
685
 Refer to the discussion of the harmonious appearance rule. See also Essa NO v Body Corporate 
of Kingsway House (9931/2008) [2009] ZAKZHC 5 (20 February 2009), where the body corporate of a 
sectional scheme sought a court order prohibiting a sectional owner from erecting advertising signs 
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its harmonious appearance. Prospective buyers are interested in purchasing a unit in 
a scheme where all the sections are similar in appearance, neat and well 
maintained. Purchasers want to be assured that their section and share in the 
common property will increase in value and will attract similar interest.  Therefore, 
restrictions such as those previously mentioned are necessary for the continued and 
future existence and success of the sectional title community. 
 
5 3 Concluding remarks 
The thesis has attempted to answer the research question posed in the introductory 
chapter, which questioned whether the model management and conduct rules 
prescribed by the Sectional Titles Act and the rules amended, added to, substituted, 
repealed and adopted by either the developer initially or later by the trustees of the 
body corporate of a sectional title scheme, are constitutionally valid.  
 
It can be concluded that the various types of rules governing sectional title schemes 
restrict and limit sectional owners’ and occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment 
of their individual sections and share in the common property. However, after being 
tested against the property clause686 and other non-property rights,687 to determine if 
the rules are reasonable in their application and constitutionally permissible, it can be 
seen that the application of the rules do not amount to arbitrary deprivations of 
property and are justified in terms of the property clause.  However, if there is no 
sufficient reason for the deprivation of property rights and entitlements by the 
restrictive rules and the deprivation is not rationally linked to a legitimate purpose, it 
will be arbitrary and constitutionally invalid. 
 
The various types of rules prescribed or authorised by the Sectional Titles Act, 
authorises a deprivation of property, namely a restriction on the sectional owners 
and occupiers’ entitlements of use and enjoyment and must establish a sufficient 
reason for the deprivation, such as the necessity to form a harmonious community. 
                                                                                                                                       
on the common property of the scheme. See further the discussion in chapter 3 under the heading 3 3 
2 4. 
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The deprivation must be justified by establishing a proportionate balance between 
the ends sought, namely the regulation of sectional owners’ use rights for the benefit 
of the community and the means employed, namely the rules limiting the 
entitlements of use and enjoyment.  
 
The various types of rules governing sectional title schemes can be seen as a 
reasonable regulation of property rights in relation to specific property by a private 
body, the body corporate that is responsible for the enforcement of the rules and 
compliance therewith. These rules are imposed by the body corporate as law of 
general application and are not arbitrary. There is a sufficient reason for the 
deprivation and it is rationally linked to a legitimate purpose. The rules serve as a 
normal and reasonable regulation of property rights in the interest of the community 
of sectional owners in as far as they contribute to a harmonious relationship between 
the trustees of the body corporate and the sectional owners and occupiers as 
members of the body corporate as well as between the members of the body 
corporate inter se. The rules serve an important function in this regard. Therefore, 
they are considered reasonable and constitutionally valid in as far as they do not 
enforce excessive regulation and as long as they are equally applicable and do not 
unfairly differentiate in their application. Rules which enforce excessive regulation or 
unreasonable and unequal restrictions are not constitutionally permissible unless its 
application is justified. 
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Abbreviations 
CCR:  Constitutional Court Review 
CILSA: Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
Harv LR: Harvard Law Review 
Int & Comp LQ: International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
Israel LR: Israel Law Review 
Juta’s SA Journal of Property: Juta’s South African Journal of Property 
SALJ: South African Law Journal 
Stell LR: Stellenbosch Law Review 
THRHR: Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 
TSAR: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
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